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ABSTRACT
Oppression comes in many shapes and sizes. Although various, 
noteworthy forms of oppression have plagued this nation for 
centuries, same-sex couples have experienced a type of oppression 
unlike any other. However, the Obergefell decision is a significant 
development toward the equalization of same-sex couples’ rights, as 
the fundamental right to marry is now extended to the equally 
deserving homosexual community. Yet, an important aspect of 
marriage is the ability to grow a family, and same-sex couples 
cannot capitalize on that opportunity as easily as heterosexual 
couples. Blame science. Therefore, same-sex couples should be 
considered infertile, by definition, and should be afforded infertility 
insurance coverage to provide them with the ability to achieve 
biological parenthood. This Comment will explore the abundance of 
reasons why infertility insurance coverage for same-sex couples is 
imperative.
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INTRODUCTION
Erin and Marianne Krupa (the Krupas) are a same-sex married 
couple who, like many other married couples, want desperately to 
start a family.1 However, the Krupas face barriers that set them apart 
from the vast majority of married couples—they cannot naturally 
conceive a child without the assistance of either an opposite sex 
counterpart or Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART).2 Erin 
Krupa, the designated gestational carrier, was denied infertility 
insurance coverage because, by definition, she did not meet the 
statutory threshold.3 According to the denial letter that the Krupas 
received from their insurance company, a woman under the age of 
thirty-five is only eligible to receive infertility insurance coverage by 
participating in unprotected heterosexual intercourse for at least two 
years.4 The denial letter aligns with New Jersey’s insurance statute, 
1. See Complaint at 4-5, Krupa v. Badolato, No. 16-CV-4637 (D.N.J. Aug. 
1, 2016). This cause of action also involves two other same-sex couples—Sol Mejias 
and her wife, Yanassa Hernandez, as well as Sarah Mills and her partner, Gloria 
Torres. See id. at 3. All parties reside in New Jersey and are experiencing the same 
infertility struggles. See id. However, for the purpose of this Note, the Krupas’s 
story shall be the focus.
2. See id. at 2-3 (“Accordingly, because Plaintiffs are women in same-sex 
relationships and do not engage in sexual intercourse with men, notwithstanding the 
fact that their doctors have determined by way of noncontroversial, medically-
accepted diagnostic techniques that they do indeed suffer from infertility, New 
Jersey law leaves them with no way to qualify as infertile for purposes of insurance 
coverage whatsoever.”).
3. See id. at 5. This denial was given notwithstanding the fact that Erin 
Krupa’s doctor determined she could not conceive without the use of infertility 
treatment. See id.
4. See id. (“[The] denial letter specifically stated, in relevant part, that 
‘[i]nfertility means the disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of 
the reproductive system such that: . . . [a] female under 35 years of age is unable to 
conceive after two years of unprotected sexual intercourse,’ and ‘[t]o be labeled as 
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which limits infertility coverage to individuals who have been 
unsuccessful in getting pregnant after having unprotected sexual 
intercourse with a member of the opposite sex for a period of not less 
than two years.5 Because the Krupas are in a committed lesbian 
relationship, they are automatically disqualified from receiving 
infertility insurance coverage because they do not participate in 
sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex.6 The 
overarching purpose of the Krupas’s lawsuit is to pursue “the right of 
all New Jersey women who dream of becoming mothers to access 
the reproductive health care they need to realize that dream on an 
equal basis.”7
Like many Americans, the Krupas struggle with infertility—but 
the type of infertility experienced by the Krupas, and same-sex 
couples in general, is vastly different than that of heterosexual 
couples.8 Infertility experienced by heterosexual couples is medical 
infertility, which is generally defined as “infertility attributable to 
disease, condition, illness, or injury,” and is what the majority of the 
population understands infertility to be.9 However, same-sex couples 
experience structural infertility, which describes those who are not 
structurally able to naturally conceive a child through unprotected 
sexual intercourse.10 The overwhelming majority of insurance 
having infertility and being eligible for infertility treatments, [the insurance] policy 
based on the New Jersey mandate requires that a patient age less than 35 years fail to
conceive after two years of trying.’”).
5. See id. at 2-3; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:27-46.1x(a) (West 2001); 
see also infra notes 260 and 261.
6. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 5. Notably, Erin Krupa had 
endometriosis and uterine cysts. See id. at 4. Typically, insurance providers cover 
infertility treatment for women with endometriosis. See id. However, since Erin 
failed to satisfy New Jersey’s other requirement—having unsuccessful, unprotected 
sex with a male counterpart for a period of two years or more—her insurance 
provider denied infertility treatment insurance coverage. See id. at 5.
7. Michael Catalini, Lawsuit in N.J. Sets Precedents for “Infertility”,
DENVER POST, Aug. 14, 2016, at 4A.
8. See infra Part II. Notwithstanding the fact that Erin Krupa had medical 
issues preventing her from conceiving, she and her partner were denied insurance 
coverage because they did not meet the threshold of having unprotected sexual
intercourse with a person of the opposite sex. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 5. 
This, by definition, encompasses structural infertility. See id.
9. See Katherine Pratt, Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment: 
Implications of Magdalin v. Commissioner for Opposite-Sex Couples, Gay and 
Lesbian Same-Sex Couples, and Single Women and Men, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1283,
1286 (discussing how the legal field typically defines infertility).
10. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debt Financing of Parenthood, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149 (2009) (“[A]ssisted reproduction is also important to 
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statutes that provide infertility coverage do not extend the coverage 
to same-sex couples.11 However, since the gravamen of Obergefell v. 
Hodges was to position same-sex couples on equal footing with 
heterosexual couples,12 the decision raises challenging questions 
about what else needs to be done under the law to accomplish that 
equality.13
As Justice Kennedy so profoundly stated in Obergefell, the 
constitutional right to marry encompasses a multitude of aspects—
one being childbearing.14 While strides have been made in 
recognizing the fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples, 
there are a variety of laws that require amendments to fully equalize 
the rights of same-sex couples.15 Particularly, as it pertains to the 
current definition of infertility in most insurance statutes, same-sex 
couples cannot claim infertility for the reason that they are 
anatomically incapable of naturally conceiving a child.16 Thus, 
notwithstanding their structural infertility, same-sex couples are 
essentially precluded from obtaining the necessary infertility 
insurance coverage to assist them in starting a family and to alleviate 
the financial burden associated with infertility treatments.17 Aside 
those with ‘structural infertility’—that is, those who want to be parents but do not 
want to engage in heterosexual intercourse.”); see also Lisa C. Ikemoto, The 
In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1007, 1009, 1033
(1996) (coining the term “dysfertile” to define the type of infertility same-sex 
couples face).
11. See Erez Aloni & Judith Daar, Marriage Equality: One Step Down the 
Path Toward Family Justice, 57 ORANGE CTY. LAW. 22, 24 (2015) (discussing how 
same-sex family formation is essentially prohibited by statutory language). Only 
fourteen of fifty states have insurance statutes that offer or address infertility 
insurance coverage. See, e.g., Valarie Blake, It’s an ART Not a Science: State-
Mandated Insurance Coverage of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Legal 
Implications for Gay and Unmarried Persons, 12 M INN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 651, 662
(2011) (discussing the effects of the fourteen states that provided infertility 
insurance at the time of the writing).
12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (“They ask for 
equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”).
13. See generally Complaint, supra note 1.
14. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (“The constitutional marriage right has 
many aspects, of which childbearing is only one.”).
15. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 22-23 (discussing that other issues 
need to be addressed after the legalization of same-sex marriage).
16. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149 (“The traditional and common 
definition of infertility covers those who have not conceived after a designated 
period of unprotected heterosexual intercourse.”).
17. See Blake, supra note 11, at 653-54 (“Of the fourteen states with some 
form of insurance mandate, none explicitly excludes gay or unmarried persons from 
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from scant federal regulations, such as the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), states are left to determine the insurance laws within their 
respective states.18 Therefore, federal regulations should be put in 
place to mandate that states, especially those that offer infertility 
insurance coverage for heterosexual couples, also offer coverage for 
structurally infertile same-sex couples.19 Obergefell is a major stride 
toward the equalization of homosexual rights, but in many ways it is 
just the beginning.20 Where the next developmental focus will be is 
ultimately a mystery, but equal access to childbearing is undoubtedly 
on the horizon.21
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and evolution of 
same-sex couples’ rights and provides a detailed outlook on the 
coverage, but many serve to indirectly exclude these groups, raising distinct ethical 
and legal issues around what a state owes its citizens with respect to 
insurance coverage of ART.”). Structural infertility is also commonly used to define 
the infertility faced by single individuals, but single individuals are beyond the 
scope of this Comment. See Anne R. Dana, The State of Surrogacy Laws: 
Determining Legal Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 353,
359 (2011).
18. See Health Care Coverage Options for Same-Sex Couples,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/married-same-sex-couples-and-the-
marketplace/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ3L-5Y6Y] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (“An 
insurance company that offers health coverage to opposite-sex couples must do the 
same for same-sex couples.”). Note, the original material quoted has been removed 
as a result of the change in administration. For a summary of the removed material 
see Tami Luhby, Trump Administration Starts Deleting Obamacare References from 
Sites, CNN M ONEY (Feb. 9, 2017 8:51 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/09/
news/economy/obamacare-hhs-trump/index.html [https://perma.cc/EJF5-RWMS]. 
See also Affordable Care Act, NAT’L NETWORK LIBR. M ED.,
https://nnlm.gov/sea/guides/affordable-care-act [https://perma.cc/224Q-MBTG] (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2017) (“The Affordable Care Act put in place comprehensive health 
insurance reforms that have improved access, affordability, and quality in health 
care for Americans.”). However, while the ACA is still active at the time of this 
writing, with the election of President Donald Trump, the ACA may be repealed. 
See Alison Kodjak, Trump, GOP Lawmakers Back Off from Immediate Obamacare 
Repeal, NPR (Feb. 6, 2017, 12:40 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2017/02/06/513718166/trump-congressional-gop-back-off-from-immediate-
obamacare-repeal [https://perma.cc/8BV5-G83W]. Therefore, the ACA will not be a 
focus of this Comment.
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 24 (discussing that reform is 
imperative after the Obergefell decision).
21. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 1, at 5; Alex Bollinger, Lesbian Couple 
Crowdfunding Fertility Treatments After Government Refuses to Help, LGBTQ
NAT. (Feb. 8, 2017), http://lgbtqnation.com/2017/02/uk-lesbian-couple-crowd-
funding-fertility-treatments/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Sendible&utm_
campaign=RSS [http://perma.cc/ZT3Y-FENT]. 
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applicability of the landmark decision—Obergefell v. Hodges. It then 
concludes with the constitutional implications of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in denying 
same-sex couples infertility services. Part II of this Comment
examines the infertility treatment options—also known as ART—
available to same-sex couples.22 It also explores state statutes that 
mention, provide for, or offer infertility insurance coverage 
generally, but explicitly or implicitly exclude same-sex couples. It 
then examines the two state statutes—California and Maryland—that 
do explicitly account for same-sex couples within their insurance 
codes. Part III of this Comment assesses the legal foundation 
pertaining to same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry—and 
have a family—and evaluates the infertility hurdle they face. It then 
outlines the necessity of redefining infertility and why Obergefell
and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses warrant 
redefinition.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Throughout history, same-sex couples have faced oppression 
and prejudice in their fight for equality.23 The history and evolution 
of homosexual individuals’ rights has been marked by significant 
court considerations and legislation.24 However, equalization in the 
eyes of the law is coming to fruition in the twenty-first century.25
Notably, the Obergefell decision is the most recent case that has 
dramatically reshaped the landscape of homosexual rights under the 
law.26 With this decision, same-sex couples have been afforded the 
right to marry through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses—the far-reaching implications 
of which have yet to be seen.27
22. The treatments are applicable to individuals and heterosexual couples as 
well, but this Comment focuses on same-sex couples.
23. See infra Section I.A; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2596-97 (2015) (outlining the evolution of homosexual rights).
24. See infra Sections I.A, I.B.
25. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (granting the fundamental right to 
marry to same-sex couples).
26. See infra Section I.B.
27. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (implicating the possibility of more 
developments).
602 Michigan State Law Review 2017
A. History and Evolution of Homosexual Rights: Pre-Obergefell
Homosexual individuals’ rights have evolved significantly over 
the past hundred years.28 The demise of homosexual discrimination is 
not yet comprehensive, but society and the law have significantly 
progressed from where they were well into the twentieth century.29
Until the mid-twentieth century, homosexuality was categorized as 
criminal and immoral wrongdoing.30 For much of the twentieth 
century, homosexuals were considered outcasts who had no dignity 
or value in society.31 This characterization caused many homosexuals 
to remain closeted in order to avoid the social discomfiture and 
condemnation associated with admitting their immutable sexual 
orientation.32
Post-World War II, the criminalization of same-sex sexual 
activity persisted in the majority of states, and openly gay and 
lesbian individuals experienced discrimination within many facets of 
their lives.33 During this post-World War II era, homosexuality was 
also classified as an illness,34 such that it was listed as a mental 
28. See id. at 2596-97; see also DOUGLAS ABRAMS ET. AL., CONTEMPORARY 
FAMILY LAW 82-84, 108 (West 4th ed. 2015) (providing a summary of the evolution 
of same-sex couples rights).
29. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595-97 (discussing the pertinent 
cases that lead to the legalization of same-sex marriage).
30. See id. at 2596 (“Until the mid-20th century, same-sex intimacy long 
had been condemned as immoral by the state itself in most Western nations, a belief 
often embodied in the criminal law.”).
31. See id. (“For this reason, among others, many persons did not deem 
homosexuals to have dignity in their own distinct identity. A truthful declaration by 
same-sex couples of what was in their hearts had to remain unspoken.”).
32. See id.; see also Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8-9, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571 & 14-574), http://www.apa.org/about/
offices/ogc/amicus/obergefell-supreme-court.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLF6-3MRJ] 
(discussing the normalcy and immutability associated with homosexuality).
33. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596. This discrimination also included 
government employment, military service, immigration, and law enforcement, as 
well as a burden on homosexual individuals’ right to associate. Id. Homosexual 
persons were also the targets of police during this post-World War II era. Id.; see 
also Brief for Organization of American Historians as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 10-15, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-
562, 14-571, & 14-574), http://www.oah.org/site/assets/files/5849/obergefell--
_oah_amicus.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L29-QK9H] (discussing the discrimination that 
homosexual individuals faced throughout the twentieth century).
34. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596. See The History of Psychiatry & 
Homosexuality, LGBT M ENTAL HEALTH SYLLABUS, http://www.aglp.org/
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disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM).35 It was not until the onset of the political and 
social reforms of the late-twentieth century that same-sex couples 
comfortably expressed and openly depicted their homosexual 
lifestyle.36 Thus, the beginning of the twenty-first century brought 
momentous strides towards the equalization of same-sex couples’ 
rights.37
Initial legal decisions rationalized the denial of marriage 
equality for same-sex couples by interpreting the Constitution as 
offering no legal basis for same-sex marriage.38 With a narrow 
interpretation of the Constitution, the breadth of marriage was
limited to the unity of a man and a woman.39 The first decision 
involving homosexual rights came in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick ,
which stemmed from a challenge to a state statute that criminalized 
homosexual sexual contact and conduct—specifically, homosexual 
sodomy.40 In Bowers, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
gap/1_history/ [https://perma.cc/8YCR-HZCY] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (“The 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) removed homosexuality from its official 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1973. This 
decision occurred in the context of momentous cultural changes brought on by the 
social protest movements of the 1950s to the 1970s: beginning with the African-
American civil rights movement, then evolving on to the women’s and gay rights 
movements.”).
35. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596; Brief for American Psychological 
Association et al., supra note 32, at 7 (elaborating on the DSM classification of 
homosexuality as a mental disorder in 1952).
36. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (“In the late 20th century, following 
substantial cultural and political developments, same-sex couples began to lead 
more open and public lives and to establish families.”); The History of Psychiatry & 
Homosexuality, supra note 34.
37. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (stating that after Massachusetts 
invalidated same-sex marriage bans, other states followed suit).
38. See id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(discussing how the Constitution does not provide a basis for the precedent set by 
the majority).
39. See id. at 2595 (majority opinion) (discussing how marriage was 
deemed a male–female partnership since this nation’s founding). 
40. 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986) (dealing with homosexual rights in terms of 
relationship autonomy). However, the first case addressing a homosexual-related 
claim generally was in the 1950s when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court considered an injunction against the Los Angeles, California, 
Postmaster, Otto K. Olesen, because of his refusal to mail a homosexual magazine 
through the mail. See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 773 (9th Cir. 1957), rev’d,
355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curium). The Ninth Circuit said that the magazine lustfully 
incited the homosexual reader and was obscene material. Id. at 778. However, the 
Supreme Court ultimately reversed the circuit court in a one-sentence opinion and 
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whether the Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to participate in homosexual sexual activity.41 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that because homosexual sodomy is a non-
procreative form of sexual intercourse, and the decision to engage in 
that sexual conduct is not for the purpose of marriage or family, 
homosexuals do not have the fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy.42 The Supreme Court arrived at that decision 
notwithstanding the fact that the conduct involved two consenting 
adults within the privacy of their own home.43
Homosexual rights seemed to be on an upward trajectory, 
comparatively, upon the onset of the 1990s.44 In 1996 in Romer v. 
Evans, the Supreme Court invalidated a state constitutional 
amendment that attempted to politically exile homosexual 
individuals strictly because of their sexual orientation.45 Because the 
amendment did not further a legitimate state interest and instead 
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, the Supreme Court 
found that the law was at odds with the Equal Protection Clause and 
invalidated it. 46 Nevertheless, also in 1996 and during the Clinton 
regime, Congress ratified the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 
which further restricted the acceptance of a homosexual lifestyle.47
imposed the injunction, thus ordering the postmaster to deliver the magazine through 
regular mail. See One, Inc., 355 U.S. at 371. 
41. See 478 U.S. at 190. The Court specified that the case did not call for a 
determination about “whether laws against sodomy between consenting adults in 
general, or between homosexuals in particular, are wise or desirable.” Id.
42. See id. at 191. Since there was “[n]o connection between family, 
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other,” the 
Court found no legal basis for extending a sodomy right. See id.
43. See id. at 190-91. The Court further indicated that determining non-
textual rights hinges upon the “Justices’ own choice of values on the States and the 
Federal Government.” Id.
44. See generally ABRAMS, ET. AL., supra note 28; see also Gay Rights 
Movement, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/
entry/Gay_rights_movement (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (detailing the gay rights 
movement that began in the late 1980s and is still continuing today). 
45. 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (“[L]aws of the kind now before us raise 
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward 
the class of persons affected.”).
46. See id. at 635-36. Because a “general announcement” that homosexual 
individuals do not deserve general protections under the law conveys no “rational 
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose,” the Court could not conclude 
that the Colorado legislation was legitimate. See id.
47. See Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat.
2419 (1996). DOMA defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman 
for the purposes of federal law; thus, the DOMA definition applied to all federal 
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However, in 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. 
Windsor that DOMA was unconstitutional to the extent that it served 
as an obstacle for federal recognition regarding the validity of same-
sex marriages.48 The Court stated that DOMA impermissibly targets 
same-sex couples and strips them of the dignity involved in their 
committed relationship, which forces even their own children to feel 
inferior.49 The Supreme Court grounded its decision in the liberty 
granted to persons by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
found that DOMA had an unconstitutional, disparate effect on lawful 
same-sex marriages.50
In 2003, Massachusetts broke the mold and became the first 
state to make significant strides toward the equalization of same-sex 
marriage.51 In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that its state Constitution 
laws, but not to state laws. See Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why 
the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1997).
However, in 2013, the Court declared this provision of DOMA unconstitutional in 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Critics suspect that DOMA was 
enacted as a response to the growing acceptance of a homosexual lifestyle. See
ABRAMS, ET. AL., supra note 28, at 89. The two predominant objectives of DOMA 
were (1) to defend the sanctity of marriage by limiting it to and defining it as the 
union of one man and one woman, notwithstanding the marriage’s lawfulness where 
it was performed, and (2) to authorize states with the right to refuse to recognize 
lawful marriages that were performed across state lines. See Koppelman, supra note 
47, at 1-2.
48. 133 S. Ct. at 2695-96 (discussing the harm that DOMA creates to the 
extent that it impedes same-sex couples and their families and children). DOMA 
reform was facilitated, at least in part, by the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993), after it ruled that denying marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples facilitated sex discrimination and violated the Hawaii 
state Constitution. See Linda C. McClain, Federal Family Policy and Family Values 
from Clinton to Obama, 1992-2012 and Beyond, 2013 M ICH. ST. L. REV. 1621, 1632 
(reviewing what ignited DOMA reform).
49. Id. at 2696. The Court found that no legitimate government purpose 
accompanied DOMA, as it disparaged and injured citizens who sought protection by 
state marriage laws that protected their “personhood and dignity.” Id.
50. Id. at 2695 (“While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from 
Government the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, the equal 
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment 
right all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”).
51. See ABRAMS, ET. AL., supra note 28, at 82-83. Thus, Massachusetts 
amended its Constitution to ensure that the laws and procedures that govern 
marriages equally apply to same-sex couples and that no special procedures should 
be applied to a homosexual marriage that are not applied to a heterosexual marriage. 
See Massachusetts Laws About Same-Sex Marriage, M ASS. CT. SYS.,
http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/law-lib/laws-by-subj/about/
gaymarriage.html [https://perma.cc/3UD5-67H8] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
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permitted same-sex couples to legally marry within the state;52 thus, 
Massachusetts became the first state to allow same-sex couples to 
marry.53 Before 2004, when the first same-sex couple legally married 
within the state of Massachusetts, no state had entered this 
unchartered territory.54 In some respects, Goodridge paved the way 
for other states to follow suit and enact similar same-sex marriage 
legislation.55 Finally, in 2015, the Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of whether same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry 
under the Constitution.56
B. The Obergefell v. Hodges Decision
By the time Obergefell reached the United States Supreme 
Court, many state and federal courts had already considered same-
sex marriage.57 The Obergefell decision has done more than legalize 
52. 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts ruled that the Massachusetts state Constitution required the allowance 
of same-sex couples to civilly marry. See id. Using a rational basis test, the Court 
determined three legislative policy rationales that belie the prohibition of same-sex 
couples’ right to marry. Id. at 961. First is the societal preference for “providing a 
‘favorable setting for procreation;’” second, that the ideal environment for 
childrearing encompasses a two-parent family; and third, marriage helps maintain 
the sparse financial resources of State and private institutions. Id.
53. See ABRAMS, ET. AL., supra note 28, at 83; supra text accompanying 
note 51. See generally Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941.
54. See Kailani Koenig, Ten Years Ago, Massachusetts Introduced Us to 
Gay Marriage, MSNBC (May 16, 2014, 6:02 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/
msnbc/ten-years-ago-massachusetts-introduced-us-gay-marriage 
[https://perma.cc/NPM8-2EDY] (reflecting on how Massachusetts became the first 
state to legalize same-sex marriage, which led to nearly twenty other states 
legalizing same-sex marriage); see also ABRAMS, ET. AL., supra note 28, at 83.
55. See, e.g., Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036, 1045 (N.J. 2013) 
(holding that sex couples in New Jersey are permitted to enter into a civil marriage); 
Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013) (holding that New Mexico’s 
marriage laws had the effect of discriminating against same-sex couples’ rights to 
marry); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481-82 (Conn. 2008) 
(holding that Connecticut General Statute § 46b-38nn was a violation of 
Connecticut’s state Constitution to the extent that it permitted same-sex marriage).
56. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (addressing 
the issue of whether the fundamental right to marry should be extended to same-sex 
couples).
57. See id. at 2597 (“After years of litigation, legislation, referenda, and the 
discussions that attended these public acts, the States are now divided on the issue of 
same-sex marriage.”). For an exhaustive list of all of the prior state decisions 
relating to same-sex couples’ right to marry or their efforts to have their out-of-state 
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same-sex marriage—the language within the Supreme Court’s 
opinion has laid a foundation for a multitude of same-sex 
equalization laws to captivate the legal landscape.58 Obergefell 
addressed a circuit split regarding the legalization of same-sex 
marriage.59 Ultimately, the Court held that the right to marry is a 
fundamental right that is extended to same-sex couples, as it is an 
integral part of the liberty granted to persons under the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses.60 Obergefell explored the 
plethora of reasons why marriage is of transcendent importance and 
quoted Cicero in saying that “[t]he first bond of society is marriage; 
next, children; and then the family.”61 In exploring those reasons, the 
Supreme Court concluded that because of the divine importance of 
marriage and its sanctity, same-sex couples seek its privileges and 
responsibilities.62
Justice Kennedy enumerated four principles of marriage to 
demonstrate why, pursuant to the Constitution, marriage equality is a 
fundamental right that must also be afforded to same-sex couples.63
First, precedential decisions signify that the decision to marry is 
embedded within personal autonomy.64 Second, marriage represents 
marriages recognized, see id. at 2608-11 (citing Appendix A to Opinion of the 
Court).
58. See generally Aloni & Daar, supra note 11 (discussing the other issues 
that need to be addressed after the recognition of same-sex marriage).
59. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. Obergefell involves fourteen 
plaintiffs who challenged laws within the states of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee. See id. at 2593.
60. See id. at 2604, 2593 (“The Constitution promises liberty to all within 
its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a 
lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”).
61. See id. at 2594; see also CICERO DE OFFICIIS, M ORAL GOODNESS 57
(Walter Miller, trans., Woods & Sons, Ltd. 1913) (“For since the reproductive 
instinct is by nature’s gift the common possession of all living creatures, the first 
bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that between parents and 
children; then we find one home, with everything in common. And this is the 
foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it were, of the state.”).
62. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. Furthermore, because of the 
immutability associated with homosexuality, same-sex marriage is the only avenue 
for same-sex couples to attain the associated benefits that follow from the 
commitment of marriage. See id.
63. See id. at 2599 (“The four principles and traditions to be discussed 
demonstrate the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with 
equal force to same-sex couples.”). 
64. See id. (“A first premise of the Court’s relevant precedents is that the 
right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual 
autonomy.”).
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a unique and committed two-person union that is incomparable to 
any other.65 Third, marriage safeguards children and families, which 
is inherent in the interrelated rights of childrearing and procreation.66
Lastly, marriage is the keystone of American social order, as it is 
embedded in this nation’s history and tradition.67
Regarding the third principle—that marriage safeguards 
children and families—Justice Kennedy highlighted the integral 
nature of the liberty granted to persons by the Due Process Clause.68
Among other rights, the right to bring up children is at the core of 
due process.69 Additionally, in extending the right to marry to same-
sex couples, children will enjoy the integrity and love associated 
with their family, in conjunction with other families among them.70
Moreover, allowing same-sex couples to marry provides the 
necessary permanency and stability associated with a child’s best 
interest.71
Justice Kennedy further highlights that same-sex couples 
already provide loving homes to thousands of children—whether 
biological, adopted, or foster—which solidifies that homosexual 
persons are equally fit to parent in the eyes of the law.72 However, 
65. See id. (“A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the 
right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any 
other in its importance to the committed individuals.”).
66. See id. at 2600 (“A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it 
safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of 
childrearing, procreation, and education.”).
67. See id. at 2601 (“Fourth and finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s 
traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.”).
68. See id. at 2600. There are two different types of due process—
substantive and procedural—and here, Justice Kennedy is referring to substantive 
due process. See id. at 2600, 2616, 2632.
69. See id. at 2600 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978))
(“[T]he right to ‘marry, establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”). Zablocki “directly connect[s] the 
right to marry with the ‘right to procreate.’” See id. at 2614.
70. See id. at 2600 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694-
95 (2013)). The protections and benefits that marriage provides to children are so 
material that preventing same-sex families from enjoying those protections and 
benefits does not serve anyone’s best interest. See id.
71. See id. (“Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important 
to children’s best interests.”).
72. See id. (“As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide loving 
and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted. And hundreds 
of thousands of children are presently being raised by such couples. Most States 
have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as individuals or as couples, and 
many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents. This provides powerful 
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the Supreme Court does not want all married persons to feel the 
pressure to have children.73 Rather, the Supreme Court recognizes 
that the fundamental right to marry encompasses a multitude of 
characteristics—one of which is childbearing.74
The Supreme Court further identifies the vital role of the Equal 
Protection Clause in legalizing same-sex marriage.75 Analyzing years 
of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the 
Equal Protection Clause is the constitutional hook that has and will 
continue to correct inequities found within the institution of 
marriage.76 Therefore, through the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses, same-sex couples are granted the fundamental right to 
marry in all states.77
In addressing a counterargument regarding destroying the 
sanctity of the marital union as it pertains to “natural procreation and 
marriage,” the Supreme Court further addressed the relationship 
between marriage and parenthood.78 In recognizing that relationship,
like many other decisions married couples encounter, same-sex 
couples are permitted to decide whether to have children.79 All 
married couples arrive at that decision after significant personal, 
romantic, and practical considerations.80 Pronouncing that no union 
confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create loving, supportive 
families.”). 
73. See id. at 2601 (“That is not to say the right to marry is less meaningful 
for those who do not or cannot have children.”).
74. See id. Thus, marriage is not just about procreation, but it often involves 
procreation, along with a multitude of other things. See id.
75. See id. at 2603-04 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause has 
been used throughout history to accomplish equality).
76. See id. at 2603. The more that society transforms, the more inequities 
that are created that need to be corrected; thus, the Equal Protection Clause provides 
the legal basis for doing so. See id.
77. See id. at 2604-05. Because the right to marry is such a fundamental 
aspect of our system of ordered liberty, same-sex couples cannot be deprived of the 
right to marry any longer. See id. at 2604.
78. See id. at 2606-07 (“The respondents also argue allowing same-sex
couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution by leading to fewer opposite-sex 
marriages. This may occur, the respondents contend, because licensing same-sex 
marriage severs the connection between natural procreation and marriage. That 
argument, however, rests on a counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couple’s 
decisionmaking processes regarding marriage and parenthood.”).
79. See id.
80. See id. (“Decisions about whether to marry and raise children are based 
on many personal, romantic, and practical considerations; and it is unrealistic to 
conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not to marry simply because 
same-sex couples may do so.”).
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is more profound than the one experienced between two persons 
within a marriage, which exemplifies the paramount paradigms of 
love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family,81 the Supreme Court 
avowed that same-sex couples are no longer unequal in the eyes of 
the law.82 Since the modern interpretation of liberty allowed for the 
legalization of same-sex marriage,83 the analytical framework of the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses is essential to a full 
understanding of how courts utilize the Fourteenth Amendment to 
address constitutional protections.84
C. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses
The liberty granted under the Fourteenth Amendment 
continuously allows for the correction of inequities within the 
fundamental aspects of personhood.85 The interpretation of liberty 
and what constitutes a fundamental aspect of personhood transforms 
as society continues to evolve.86 Whether the issue involves 
“vindicating precepts of liberty and equality” or identifying personal 
beliefs, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses provide the 
textual support for such disputes.87
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”88 The former clause—known as the Due 
Process Clause—acts as a safeguard against unfair government 
practices;89 whereas the essence of the latter clause—known as the 
Equal Protection Clause—is that states shall treat similarly situated 
81. Id. at 2608 (“No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies 
the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.”).
82. See id. (“They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The 
Constitution grants them that right.”).
83. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (addressing the issue 
of whether the fundamental right to marry should be extended to same-sex couples).
84. See infra Section I.C.
85. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2603 (discussing the various uses of 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
86. See id. at 2604.
87. See id. at 2597, 2604.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (ratified in 1868).
89. See Timothy Sandefur, Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due 
Process, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY, 115, 148-55 (2010) (detailing the functionality 
and uses of substantive due process).
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persons equally, shall govern impartially, and shall not make 
distinctions against persons that are grounded in illegitimate 
governmental purposes.90 Commonly used—either together or 
separately—to invalidate or uphold laws, the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses are fundamental to American personhood and 
maintaining the fabric of our society.91
An analysis under the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses is practically parallel in terms of safeguarding fundamental 
rights, as under either clause the Supreme Court must analyze 
whether an asserted liberty is sufficiently important so as to be 
classified as fundamental.92 The notable difference in safeguarding 
fundamental rights under Equal Protection or Due Process hinges 
upon how the constitutional arguments are formulated.93 Under Due 
Process, the issue is whether the government is justified in infringing
upon a fundamental right by an adequate purpose.94 Conversely, 
90. See Equal Protection, LEGAL INFO. INST. (LII),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equal_protection [https://perma.cc/D8M7-4V9Z] 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause is applied, 
interpreted, and utilized); see also Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The 
Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 M ICH. L. REV. 1, 119 (1998)
(stating that the Equal Protection Clause requires at least equal concern and respect 
for individuals).
91. See generally Equal Protection, supra note 90. See also David M. 
Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 M ARQ. L.
REV. 975, 995, 997 (1992) (noting that the Court has thus evidenced a marked 
tendency to use the Equal Protection Clause to perform, in a sometimes hidden way, 
the substantive due process function of protecting unenumerated fundamental 
rights). Equality, in other words, has been used to serve the cause of protecting 
liberty. Id. at 995, 997. Autonomy theorists, who believe that “liberty” means 
“autonomy,” have thus wished to use “equality” as a means of protecting 
“autonomy.” See id. 
92. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 934 (4th ed. 2013). 
Aside from the Bill of Rights, there are no rights explicitly enumerated in the 
Constitution. See id. Rather, the fundamental rights and constitutionally protected 
liberty interests that are accorded to and enjoyed by United States’ citizens are 
implicit in the Constitution through the ninth amendment, which provides “[t]he 
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to disparage 
others retained by the people.” See id. at 935; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
While the Ninth Amendment does not grant any specific rights, it is utilized by the 
Supreme Court as textual justification for the recognition of non-textual rights 
implicit in this nation’s system of ordered liberty such that they shall be classified as
fundamental. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 935.
93. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 934-35.
94. See id. at 935 (“If a right is safeguarded under due process, the 
constitutional issue is whether the government’s interference is justified by a 
sufficient purpose.”).
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pursuant to Equal Protection, the issue is whether the governmental 
discrimination controlling who may or may not exercise a certain 
fundamental right is justified by an adequate purpose.95 The Supreme 
Court utilized both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in Obergefell to invalidate laws that 
prohibited same-sex marriage.96 Thus, the framework is imperative to 
understanding how the Supreme Court arrived at that decision.97
1. Equal Protection Framework
Equal protection is the best constitutional ground to use to 
assert a challenge against a law that grants a right to some 
individuals while denying it to others.98 Equal protection cases 
address whether the government’s classification is justified by a 
sufficient purpose.99 The overarching issue in equal protection cases 
is whether the government can identify a sufficient objective for its 
discrimination, which hinges upon the type of discrimination 
presented.100 The type of discrimination defines the level of scrutiny, 
or what standard of review, the court will use to analyze the issue at 
95. See id. (discussing what the Equal Protection Clause is generally used 
for).
96. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“These 
considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right 
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived 
of [the] right and [the] liberty [to marry].”).
97. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 933-39 (detailing the 
Equal Protection and Due Process framework).
98. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 935.
99. See id. at 712. In the original draft of the United States Constitution, 
there were no provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. See id. at 711. 
The lack of an Equal Protection Clause in the original draft of the Constitution was 
unsurprising, seeing as the document was first drafted during a time of slavery and 
subordination of women. See id. It was not until after the Civil War of 1861 when 
extensive discrimination plagued the nation that the Equal Protection Clause was 
drafted, but it was not until after Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 that the 
Supreme Court utilized it. See id.; see also 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). However, 
since the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states, there is technically no 
provision within the Constitution that serves as a directive to the federal government 
that it may not deny equal protection of the laws. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92,
at 711. To solve that problem, the Supreme Court ruled in Bolling v. Sharpe that the 
Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal government through the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See id.; see also 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
100. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 712 (“What constitutes a sufficient 
justification depends . . . on the type of discrimination. For instance, the Supreme 
Court has declared that it is . . . suspicious of race discrimination.”).
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hand.101 In an equal protection case, three questions serve as 
guideposts for the analysis.102 First, “what is the classification?”; 
second, “what level of scrutiny should be applied?”; third, “does the 
particular government action meet the level of scrutiny?”103
a. What Is the Classification?
The analysis starts with a determination of what the 
classification is, or how the government is distinguishing among 
individuals.104 A classification can exist either on its face or as 
applied.105 A facial classification simply means that the law, by its 
very language, draws a blatant distinction among people based on a 
specific characteristic.106 Conversely, an as-applied challenge deals 
with a law that is neutral on its face, but has a discriminatory impact 
or effect on the classification.107 Proving an as-applied challenge is 
more difficult than a facial challenge, as the challenger must prove 
that the law has a discriminatory impact or effect, but must also show 
that the law has a discriminatory purpose.108
101. See id. at 712-14 (explaining the levels of scrutiny); see also Jason M. 
Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States v. 
Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1169,
1172 (1998) (discussing the three levels of scrutiny and how Equal Protection 
challenges trigger the varying levels of scrutiny).
102. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 712 (explaining that a typical 
Equal Protection analysis follows a three-question analysis).
103. See id. 712-16 (detailing the framework for an Equal Protection 
analysis).
104. See id. at 712. Identifying the classification is not always simple, as 
sometimes that may be the focal point of the pending litigation. See id.
105. See id. at 712-13 (explaining that the first question is broken up into a 
two-part analysis to determine the next step in the analysis).
106. See id. (“For example, a law that prohibits blacks from serving on juries 
is an obvious facial racial classification. Likewise, a law that says that only those 16 
and older can have drivers’ licenses is obviously a facial classification.”). 
107. See id. at 713 (“For instance, a law that requires that all police officers 
be at least 5’10” tall and 150 pounds is, on its face, only a height and weight 
classification. Statistics, however, show that 40 percent of men but only 2 percent of 
women will meet this requirement. The result is that the law has a discriminatory 
impact against women in hiring for the police force.”).
108. See id. Therefore, “women challenging the height and weight 
requirements for the police force must show that the government’s purpose was to 
discriminate based on gender.” Id.
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b. What Is the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny?
The level of scrutiny may be determined upon identification of 
the classification.109 The three types of scrutiny are strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis scrutiny.110 Strict scrutiny is 
the highest level of scrutiny and is difficult to satisfy, as it places the 
burden on the government to show that the law is necessary to 
achieve a compelling government interest.111 Additionally, under this 
standard, the government must prove that the law is the least 
discriminatory means available to achieve its compelling government 
interest, which is accomplished by narrowly tailoring the imposed 
legislation.112
The second level of scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny, which 
places the burden on the government to show that the law is 
substantially related to an important government objective.113
Consequently, the means, which is the law in question, and the end, 
or the objective that is being sought, must have a sufficiently 
significant connection such that it is considered important.114 Lastly, 
rational basis scrutiny is considered the default standard of review, 
so any law that is challenged based on a classification that does not 
109. See id.; see also Skaggs, supra note 101, at 1172 (explaining the 
different suspect classifications and their applicable levels of scrutiny).
110. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 713-14 (enumerating the scrutiny 
standards of review); see also Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in 
American Constitutional Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (1988) (“Means-
end scrutiny has three components: (1) scrutiny of government interests; (2) scrutiny 
of the effectiveness of the means chosen to further the governments interests; and 
(3) scrutiny of alternatives to determine whether less restrictive methods are 
available for furthering the government interests.”).
111. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 713. Strict scrutiny is applied to 
challenges involving race, national origin, and to cases involving aliens, unless the 
case deals with the democratic process or self-government. See id.
112. See id. By requiring the law to be the least discriminatory means, it 
requires narrow tailoring so that the law covers only what is necessary to accomplish 
the government’s objective. See id.
113. See id. Intermediate scrutiny is less stringent than strict scrutiny, but the 
burden still rests on the government to pass a more stringent standard that requires 
substantial justification for the legislation. See Skaggs, supra note 101, at 1178 
(discussing the less demanding aspects of intermediate scrutiny). See also Herman 
D. Hofman, “Exceedingly [Un]persuasive” and Unjustified: The Intermediate 
Scrutiny Standard and Single-Sex Education After United States v. Virginia, 2015 
M ICH. ST. L. REV. 2047, 2058-59 (explaining intermediate scrutiny in more detail).
114. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 713. Intermediate scrutiny applies 
to laws that discriminate on the basis of gender or against non-marital children. See 
id.
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fall into a heightened scrutiny category must satisfy the minimal 
level of rational basis review.115 Per rational basis, the burden is on 
the challenger, rather than the government, to show that the law is 
not rationally related to a legitimate government objective.116 There 
is extreme deference accorded to the government within challenges 
made under rational basis, but under each standard the government 
has certain requirements it must satisfy.117
c. Does the Government Action Meet the Level of Scrutiny?
Within this prong, courts shall analyze and evaluate both the 
means and the end to determine if the law satisfies the applicable 
level of scrutiny.118 In doing so, the focal point of the analysis is the
applicable level of scrutiny, which serves as the analytical guidepost 
and overarching rule of law for the challenge.119 Courts shall 
determine whether the end is compelling, important, or legitimate 
and whether the means are necessary and least restrictive, 
substantially related, or rationally related—depending on the level of 
scrutiny.120 The applicable standard can be determinative in 
addressing the adequacy and legality of a challenged law.121
A determination of the applicable level of scrutiny is equally 
vital in a due process claim.122 Due process requires the government 
to have an adequate reason and to employ proper procedures when 
115. See id. at 714 (“Rational basis review is the minimum level of scrutiny 
that all laws challenged under equal protection must meet.”).
116. See id.; see also Skaggs, supra note 101, at 1172 (referring to rational 
basis as the “so-called traditional approach”).
117. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 714; see also Sandefur, supra note 
89, at 160 (explaining that the leniency of the rational basis standard has permitted 
the government to enact irrational laws).
118. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 715. An analysis is entirely 
different under all levels of scrutiny. See id.
119. See id.; see also Galloway, supra note 110, at 449-50 (“Means-end 
scrutiny is . . . the most common and important form of constitutional analysis. To 
grasp how means-end scrutiny works, one must understand the components of levels 
of the process.”). 
120. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 716; see also Galloway, supra note 
110, at 449 (“Means-end scrutiny is an analytical process involving examination of 
the purposes (ends) which conduct is designed to serve and the methods (means) 
chosen to further those purposes.”).
121. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 712; see also Galloway, supra note 
110, at 449 (“Means-end scrutiny is a systematic method for evaluating the 
sufficiency of the government’s justification for its conduct.”).
122. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 938.
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infringing upon or restricting a fundamental right or constitutionally 
protected liberty interest.123 While the four-question due process 
framework differs from the equal protection framework, much of the 
substance overlaps in both analyses.124
2. Due Process Framework
The Due Process Clause is broken up into two categories: 
substantive due process and procedural due process.125 Substantive 
due process queries whether the government has an adequate reason 
to deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property.126 It requires the 
government to provide ample justification that the infringement upon 
the fundamental right at issue is adequately related to a sufficient 
justification.127 Conversely, procedural due process denotes the 
proper procedures that the government shall follow when it does 
deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property.128 The focal point of 
procedural due process tends to be the kind of notice and the type of 
a hearing that the government shall provide when it deprives an 
individual of life, liberty, or property.129 Due process is generally the 
123. See id. at 603, 935; see also Russell W. Galloway, Basic Substantive 
Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625, 625-26 (1992) (indicating that 
substantive due process came around in the late 1800s after the Supreme Court 
concluded that “deprivations of life, liberty, or property be substantively 
reasonable”).
124. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
125. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 603.
126. See id.; see also Sandefur, supra note 89, at 148 (“When a government 
action does not meet the[] standards, that action does not qualify as ‘law,’ and thus 
to enforce it in a way that deprives individuals of life, liberty, or property would by 
definition deprive them of these rights without due process of law.”).
127. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 935. Substantive due process is the 
focal point of this Comment.
128. See id. at 603; see also Due Process, LEGAL INFO. INST. (LII),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process [https://perma.cc/DZ3K-AFYA] (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2017).
129. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 603; see also Due Process, supra
note 128:
The clause also promises that before depriving a citizen of life, liberty or 
property, government must follow fair procedures. Thus, it is not always 
enough for the government just to act in accordance with whatever law 
there may happen to be. Citizens may also be entitled to have the 
government observe or offer fair procedures, whether or not those 
procedures have been provided for in the law on the basis of which it is 
acting. Action denying the process that is ‘due’ would be unconstitutional.
Id.
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best constitutional basis to challenge a law that denies a right to all 
individuals equally.130
A due process analysis consists of four questions.131 First, does 
a fundamental right exist?132 If a right is deemed fundamental, the 
government must satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis in order to 
prevail.133 However, rational basis—which is fairly easy for the 
government to satisfy—is generally applied when fundamental rights 
are not at issue.134 Second, is the constitutional right infringed?135 The 
infringement, however, must be more than minimal—it must be both 
direct and substantial.136 Third, is there a sufficient justification for 
the government’s infringement of the right?137 When a right has been 
deemed fundamental, there must be a valid, compelling 
governmental purpose for its infringement, which may be satisfied 
by the government showing that the law is essential.138 Lastly, is the 
means sufficiently related to the purpose?139 The analysis under this 
question depends upon the level of scrutiny that is triggered: The 
130. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 935.
131. See id. at 936. (“Litigation and judicial decision making in cases about 
individual rights can be understood as addressing one or more of four questions.”).
132. See id. at 936. A major aspect of the constitutional interpretation debate 
stems from how the Supreme Court should decide what a fundamental right is and 
whether non-textual rights should be deemed fundamental. See id.
133. See id. (“If a right is deemed fundamental, the government usually will 
be able to prevail only if it meets strict scrutiny.”).
134. See id. Courts generally defer to the lawmakers, but deference is not 
accorded where “there is discrimination against a ‘discrete and insular’ minority” or 
where a fundamental right is infringed. Id.
135. See id. at 937-38. A telltale sign of constitutional right infringement is if 
the right is prohibited. See id. at 938.
136. See id. at 938. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has given little direction 
about what constitutes a direct and substantial infringement. See id.; see also 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (“When a statutory classification 
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld 
unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored 
to effectuate only those interests.”).
137. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 938. Like the direct and substantial 
requirement in question two, the Supreme Court has provided little to no direction 
about what constitutes a compelling purpose. See id.
138. See id. There is no clear directive for what constitutes a compelling 
interest. See id. However, an example of the stringency of the compelling interest 
requirement was articulated in Korematsu v. United States, where the government’s 
harsh actions against Japanese Americans was justified by national security and 
wartime necessity. 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
139. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 938. The fourth question requires a 
government showing that the challenged law is absolutely necessary to achieve the 
law’s ultimate objective. See id.
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government must make a stringent showing that the law is necessary 
pursuant to strict scrutiny, whereas it only has to prove that the law is 
reasonable under rational basis review.140
Both Equal Protection and Due Process are imperative in 
safeguarding vital constitutional liberties.141 Both clauses not only 
hold the government accountable when it infringes upon 
fundamental rights, but also have granted and will continue to 
safeguard some of the most vital individual liberties enjoyed by 
people within the United States.142 While the evolution of 
homosexual rights owes much of its current state to both of these 
clauses, there are certain aspects of same-sex couples’ lives that have 
yet to be discussed and litigated—such as the inability to obtain 
biological parenthood due to structural infertility—which seemingly 
fits into the existing family and reproductive autonomy 
protections.143
3. Relevant Decisions Pertaining to Family and Reproductive 
Autonomy 
The Supreme Court recognizes the intrinsic importance of 
family and reproductive autonomy, which is evidenced by its 
continuous protection of the categorically related liberties and 
interests.144 Additionally, while sexual orientation has yet to be 
expressly held as a protected class, the Supreme Court has implicitly 
foreshadowed the potential of its inclusion.145 Furthermore, the 
140. See id. at 938-39:
This requires that the government prove that it could not attain the goal 
through any means less restrictive of the right. In comparison, under 
rational basis review, the means only has to be a reasonable way to 
achieve the goal and the government is not required to use the least 
restrictive alternative.
Id.
141. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
142. See, e.g., id. at 2597, 2603 (discussing how the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses have protected individual liberties and how both clauses are an 
integral part in safeguarding the ever-evolving societal liberties).
143. See infra Subsection I.C.3.
144. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 939-61, 967-1000 (discussing the 
protections within the family autonomy and reproductive autonomy categories).
145. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-70 (2003) (focusing on 
homosexual autonomy in making particular choices about the intimate conduct the 
individual participates in); see also Barbara B. Hill, The Hunkiest Little Whorehouse 
in Town Is Looking for a Few Good Men, but Only to Work: The Constitutional 
Implications of Heidi Fleiss’s Female Brothel, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 77, 95
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Supreme Court has stated that laws may not discriminate against an 
unpopular group of people based on such things as immutability, 
political powerlessness, and history of discrimination.146 That tenet 
served as the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. 
Evans, which invalidated a law that singled out homosexual persons 
and impermissibly discriminated against them because they were an 
unpopular group.147 However, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
deemed four aspects of family autonomy as fundamental rights, 
including the right to marry,148 the right to custody of one’s 
children,149 the right to keep one’s family together,150 and the right of 
parents to control the upbringing of their children.151 Collectively, the 
family autonomy cases stand for the principle that parents receive the 
(2007) (stating that Lawrence may be interpreted as establishing homosexuals as a 
protected class); Charles R. Calleros, Advocacy for Marriage Equality: The Power 
of a Broad Historical Narrative During a Transitional Period in Civil Rights, 2015 
M ICH. ST. L. REV. 1249, 1278 (“In some courts, classifications based on sexual 
orientation appear to have triggered a level of scrutiny in equal protection analysis 
that lies somewhere between rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny.”). The 
analysis in the Lawrence decision focused on homosexual intimacy and stated that 
“[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, 
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The 
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make 
this choice.” 539 U.S. at 567. The reasoning was that “intimate, personal choices, 
like those related to sexual intimacy, are central to an individual’s dignity, 
autonomy, and liberty.” Hill, supra note 145, at 95. Additionally, the Supreme Court 
highlighted that relationship autonomy lies at the core of an individual’s freedom of 
choice, which shall exist absent fear of being punished for it. See id. at 95-96.
146. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 714 (“[T]he Court has emphasized 
that immutable characteristics . . . warrant heightened scrutiny [because] [t]he notion 
is that it is unfair to penalize a person for characteristics that the person did not 
choose and that the individual cannot change.”).
147. See 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado state statute that 
discriminated against homosexual persons and prevented laws or policies from 
granting them any preferential treatment or from asserting claims of discrimination).
148. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that a restriction 
on the freedom to marry runs afoul of Equal Protection).
149. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (finding that the denial 
of a parent’s custody rights offends Equal Protection); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (stating that a “natural parent’s ‘desire for and right to 
“the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children”’ is an 
interest far more precious than any property right”) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
150. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) 
(establishing that the choice of relatives to live together, notwithstanding the degree 
of kinship, is a fundamental right pursuant to due process).
151. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (finding that parents 
retain the liberty to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their own children).
620 Michigan State Law Review 2017
utmost reverence when it comes to all aspects of their children’s 
lives and that the Constitution would be offended if parents’
associated rights to their children were infringed without substantial 
reason.152
Additionally, the Supreme Court has designated three aspects 
of reproductive autonomy—the right to purchase and use 
contraceptives,153 the right for a woman to choose abortion,154 and the 
right to procreate155—as fundamental rights.156 Particularly, the 
eminence of the right to procreate was recognized in the early 1940s 
in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 157 In Skinner, the Supreme Court utilized 
equal protection framework to invalidate an Oklahoma sterilization 
law and arrive at the holding that procreation is a fundamental 
right.158 The Supreme Court stated that the Oklahoma law prevented 
152. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 946; see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Smith v. 
Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)): 
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a 
state were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the 
objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of 
unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the 
children’s best interest. 
Id. See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“Like choices 
concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing, all of 
which are protected by the Constitution, decisions concerning marriage are among 
the most intimate that an individual can make.”).
153. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that 
the implicit right to privacy safeguards the right to use contraceptives); see also 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (extending the right to purchase and 
use contraceptives to all persons, both married and unmarried).
154. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (holding that women 
have the fundamental right to choose abortion); see also Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992) (reaffirming the essential holding of Roe that 
women have the right to choose abortion, but overruling the trimester framework 
and narrowing the pertinent aspects of an abortion decision).
155. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that 
procreation is fundamental to the subsistence of mankind). But see Buck v. Bell, 274 
U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927) (ruling that the sterilization of certain mentally 
handicapped individuals who may produce defective offspring is allowed, as it 
safeguards the general welfare of society). While Buck has never explicitly been 
overruled, Skinner can be said to implicitly do so. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92,
at 969.
156. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 967. However, for the purpose of 
this Comment, the reproductive autonomy focus shall be the right to procreate.
157. See 316 U.S. at 541 (holding that the right to procreate is a fundamental 
right). Consequently, Skinner also requires that involuntary, government mandated 
sterilizations receive a strict scrutiny analysis. See id. at 541.
158. See id. at 538.
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the continuation of the human race by restricting who could and 
could not produce offspring.159 According to the Supreme Court, the 
Oklahoma law had the effect of unequally punishing some criminals 
over others with a nuanced loophole in the law, which runs afoul of 
both human decency and the Equal Protection Clause.160 Therefore, 
the Court further highlighted that not only marriage,161 but also 
procreation, are fundamental rights because of their intrinsic 
importance to the maintenance of mankind.162
Summarily, the journey that the homosexual community had to 
endure to achieve equal rights to marriage provides erudition into the 
unjust imbalance of rights accorded to individuals based on sexual 
orientation.163 However, the interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses has and 
will continue to correct marital and societal inequities.164 The 
Fourteenth Amendment is already credited with the declaration of 
marriage, procreation, and childbearing as fundamental rights.165 Yet, 
procreation and childbearing are not as easily attainable for the 
homosexual community as they are for the heterosexual 
community.166 Luckily, with the assistance of ART treatments,167
family formation is still plausible; thus, examination of the available 
159. See id. at 536. The Oklahoma act in question was titled the Oklahoma’s 
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which essentially allowed the state to sterilize 
individuals who met the state’s definition of habitual criminal. See id. That is, any 
person who was convicted of two or more felonies concerning “moral turpitude.” Id.
160. See id. at 541 (“But the instant legislation runs afoul of the equal 
protection clause.”).
161. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that 
marriage is a fundamental right pursuant to Due Process).
162. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536 (discussing the importance of procreation 
in maintaining the human race).
163. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596-98 (2015) (discussing 
the pertinent cases involved in the evolution of marital equality for same-sex 
couples). See generally ABRAMS ET. AL., supra note 28, at 89-92 (illuminating the 
evolution of same-sex couples’ rights under the law). 
164. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2603 (detailing the uses of the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses); Sandefur, supra note 89, at 148-56 (explaining 
the uses of substantive due process generally); Smolin, supra note 91, at 993-94
(discussing the corresponding uses of the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses); Equal Protection, supra note 90 (explaining Equal Protection protections 
and the general applicability of the Clause).
165. See supra notes 148, 157-158 and accompanying text.
166. This is attributable to structural infertility and the associated economic 
barriers created by ART. See sources cited supra note 10.
167. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149 (explaining ART and how it can be 
used in the homosexual community).
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ART treatments and their associated costs—which may or may not 
be covered by insurance—is imperative to understanding how same-
sex couples can overcome their structural infertility barrier.168
II. INFERTILITY AND INSURANCE OPTIONS
ART provides alternatives to procreation through scientific 
technology, and its usage and demand are nearly immeasurable.169
Same-sex couples, both gay and lesbian, have a variety of infertility 
treatment options available to them, but the necessary expenditures 
associated with the treatments place a substantial encumbrance upon 
those options.170 Yet, despite the available ART options, structural 
infertility combined with the high cost of the procedures exposes the 
degree of difficulty same-sex couples face in obtaining biological 
parenthood.171 However, that difficulty is further exacerbated by the 
lack of insurance options available to same-sex couples, which 
supplements the existing economic and social reasons why same-sex 
couples currently face unconquerable barriers to biological 
parenthood.172
A. Structural Infertility, ART, and Associated Statistical Data
The term structural infertility denotes an operative barrier to 
biological procreation due to the scientific incompatibility of 
reproductive organs.173 This term is used to define the immutable 
infertility that same-sex couples experience.174 Because there is 
168. See David Orentlicher, Beyond Cloning: Expanding Reproductive 
Options for Same-Sex Couples, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 651, 651-54 (2000) (discussing 
the applicability of ART treatments for same-sex couples to achieve family life).
169. See generally Jacoby, supra note 10 (explaining what ART is and how 
it is necessary to assist the parenthood market).
170. See I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive 
Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and 
Should It Matter?, 95 M INN. L. REV. 485, 486 (2010) (explaining ART procedures 
and their associated costs).
171. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 140-50. Even with these barriers, though, 
couples frequently exhaust all options to achieve “what to them is irreplaceable.” Id.
172. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 23-24 (“The hope that marriage 
equality will adjust existing inequalities in family formation through the use of ART 
is dashed by a spate of existing laws that structurally preempt inclusion of same-sex 
couples.”).
173. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149 (explaining that structural infertility 
affects those who do not participate in heterosexual intercourse).
174. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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currently no way around structural infertility, same-sex couples are 
conscripted into employing ART procedures to accomplish 
biological parenthood.175
ART was developed in the latter portion of the twentieth 
century and, since 1978, has facilitated pregnancies for individuals 
who struggle with infertility.176 ART is a term that encompasses a 
multitude of alternative measures, separate and apart from sexual 
intercourse, that result in conception.177 By its very definition, ART 
serves as a substitute for conventional procreation, acting as a proxy 
for “reproductive systems that are either broken . . . or absent.”178
Therefore, ART allows for the creation of families that otherwise 
may not exist and affords medically and structurally infertile 
individuals and families the prospect of parenthood.179 Same-sex 
couples face infertility based upon their unassailable and immutable 
175. See Orentlicher, supra note 168, at 653. While scientific technology is 
continuously changing, there are no other options for same-sex couples to achieve 
biological parenthood. See id. However, if same-sex couples could achieve 
biological parenthood, it may reduce the stigmatism associated with homosexual 
parenting. See id.
176. See Assisted Reproductive Technology, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (CDC), http://www.cdc.gov/art/index.html [https://perma.cc/XFV4-
UUMP] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017); see also Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(ART) Timeline, http://www.artparenting.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017). The 
first baby born via IVF occurred in England in 1978, but the first baby conceived via 
IVF in the United States was in 1981 in Norfolk, Virginia. See id.
177. See JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 474
(LexisNexis 2d ed. 2013) (“Assisted reproductive technologies, by definition, 
involve the separation of sexual intercourse and human conception.”); see also Noah 
Baron & Jennifer Bazzell, Fifteenth Annual Gender and Sexuality Law: Annual 
Review Article: Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 57, 58
(2014) (“Assisted reproductive technologies involve combining sperm with ova that 
have been surgically removed from a woman’s body and returning the fertilized 
eggs to the woman’s body or donating them to another woman.”).
178. See DAAR, supra note 177, at 474.
179. See id.
Thus, ART opens up the prospect of parenthood not just to those who 
meet the clinical definition of infertility, but to those whose family 
structure is something other than a heterosexual couple. [S]ame-sex 
couples can look to ART to enable them to become parents, often 
fulfilling a dream of biological parenthood that was simply unavailable a 
generation ago.
Id.
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characteristics; thus, same-sex couples must employ ART to 
facilitate biological parenthood and familial life.180
ART is in high demand as of late. In 1996, the Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) began accumulating infertility treatment data 
from all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.181 In a 
2008 study, 38,496 of the 2.7 million infants born in the United 
States were conceived via some form of ART.182 In 2013, the CDC 
confirmed that 190,773 ART procedures were performed in that year
and that 1.6% of all children born in the United States during 2013 
were conceived using some form of ART.183 In 2014, the CDC 
confirmed that 208,604 ART procedures were performed, which 
yielded 57,323 live births.184 The following year, an additional 
17,857 ART procedures were performed, generating another 1.6% of 
children born in the United States in 2014.185 However, there is a 
notable incongruity between the supply and demand for ART 
services—as the usage of ART is still a rarity in comparison to its 
need.186
According to census data collected in 2010, there were 646,464 
same-sex couples in the United States, of which 131,729 were 
180. See id. (“[S]ame-sex couples can look to ART to enable them to 
become parents, often fulfilling a dream of biological parenthood that was simply 
unavailable a generation ago.”).
181. See Saswati Sunderam, Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance,
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/ss6411a1.htm [https://perma.cc/6E59-6NV2] (last visited Oct. 
9, 2017). 
182. See ABA Approves Model Act for Assisted Reproduction Agencies,
INT’L FERTILITY L. GROUP (IFLG), https://www.iflg.net/aba-art-agencies-model-act 
[https://perma.cc/72MG-VLSU] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017); see also Richard B. 
Vaughn, Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, A.B.A.,
https://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WP6S-9GGD] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017). 
183. See generally Sunderam, supra note 181.
184. See National Data 2014, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(CDC), https://nccd.cdc.gov/drh_art/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=DRH_
ART.ClinicInfo&ClinicId=9999&ShowNational=1 [https://perma.cc/3SS7-JY64]
(last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
185. See id.
186. See id.; see also Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149. If states utilized their 
regulatory powers to mandate infertility insurance coverage, or if the federal 
government did so on its own, there would be a significant increase in individuals 
who employ ART and, therefore, achieve their dream of biological parenthood. See 
id. at 151-53.
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married and 514,735 were unmarried.187 As of 2013, the number of 
married same-sex couples nearly doubled—totaling 251,695.188 And 
as of 2015, there are an estimated nine million lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals in the United States 
alone.189 Additionally, increasing numbers of same-sex couples are 
employing ART to fulfill their desire to have a family.190 Therefore, 
infertility insurance coverage for all ART treatments is increasingly 
important for same-sex couples.191
B. Available ART Options
There are a multitude of ART treatment options available to 
facilitate biological parenthood.192 One of the most prevalent 
treatment options is In-vitro Fertilization (IVF), which encompasses 
four stages to complete the procedure.193 The first step requires a 
female to be administered ovulation-stimulating hormones, which 
cause egg-containing follicles to mature, allowing for an abundance 
of eggs to be collected for the purpose of one IVF cycle.194 Next, 
prior to ovulation, the harvested eggs are surgically removed using a 
minimally invasive procedure.195 Then, the sperm and the egg are 
187. See DAAR, supra note 177, at 474. Lesbian same-sex couples account 
for 51% of the homosexual couple total, while male same-sex couples make up the 
remaining 49%. See id.
188. See Amy Roberts & Caitlin Stark, By the Numbers: Same-Sex Marriage
(June 12, 2015, 7:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/11/politics/btn-same-sex-
marriage [https://perma.cc/PZ6Q-BUDB].
189. Id.
190. See Ikemoto, supra note 10, at 1055, & n.170 (“[L]esbians and gay men 
do use procreative technologies to become parents.”).
191. See id. at 1055-56. Male and female same-sex couples both procreate 
through ART. See id. Thus, “mandated, or otherwise-expanded, insurance coverage 
resolves financial-access questions.” Jacoby, supra note 10, at 155.
192. See generally Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 58 (discussing the 
various forms of ART treatment options).
193. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 490. IVF had its first success in 
1978 in Oldham, England. See id.; see also Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 58 
(“IVF is the dominant form of ART.”).
194. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 490-91 (“First, the woman who
will provide eggs is administered ovulation-stimulating hormones, which cause 
multiple egg-containing follicles to mature so that up to several dozen eggs can be 
harvested in a single treatment cycle.”).
195. See id. at 491 (“Second, just prior to ovulation the eggs are removed by 
a minor surgical procedure; today this is usually done by an ultrasound-guided 
needle inserted through the vaginal wall into a developed ovarian follicle through 
which, by suction, the egg is harvested.”).
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combined in a culture dish, which is examined throughout the next 
twenty-four hours to determine if fertilization ensued.196 Lastly, if the 
fertilization was successful, physicians attempt implantation of four 
or eight embryos after a two to three day waiting period.197 The 
woman is then requested to administer a pregnancy test within ten to 
fourteen days to see if the procedure was successful.198
Another infertility treatment option available is Gamete 
Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT), which is a variant of IVF.199 GIFT 
involves direct placement of an unfertilized egg and viable sperm 
into the fallopian tubes instead of into the uterus, resulting in the 
fertilization inside of the woman’s body.200 Conversely, Zygote 
Intrafallopian Transfer (ZIFT) involves the direct placement of a pre-
fertilized egg into the fallopian tubes instead of the uterus; thus, 
fertilization is already complete prior to implantation.201
Alternatively, Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI) 
involves a minor procedure where a physician utilizes a micro-needle 
to inoculate a solitary sperm into the middle of the unfertilized 
egg.202 The now-fertilized egg is then left to develop in a laboratory 
for a period of one to five days before it is ultimately implanted into 
a woman’s uterus.203 Another option is Artificial Insemination (AI) 
or Intrauterine Insemination (IUI), which encompasses any method 
of manual sperm insertion into the uterus to facilitate fertilization.204
196. See id. (“Third, sperm is introduced into individual culture dishes, each 
of which contains a culture medium and one egg with the culture dish monitored 
after the first day to determine if fertilization occurs.”).
197. See id. (“Finally, if fertilization occurs, the preembryos are allowed to 
mature in the medium, usually for two to three days after egg retrieval, until the 
preembryos reach the four or eight cell stage when some or all of them are 
transferred into the woman’s uterus to attempt implantation.”).
198. See id. (“Ten to fourteen days after transfer, the woman will undergo a 
pregnancy test to determine if the transfer was successful.”). Frozen eggs can be 
used in IVF as well. See id.
199. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 58-59.
200. See id. (“In GIFT, unfertilized eggs and sperm are placed in the 
fallopian tube and fertilization occurs inside of the body.”).
201. See id. (“ZIFT, on the other hand, involves placement of a pre-fertilized 
egg in the fallopian tubes.”).
202. See id. (“In ICSI, a doctor uses a small needle to inject a single sperm 
into the center of an egg.”).
203. See id. (“[T]he fertilized egg grows in a laboratory for one to five days 
before being placed in the woman’s uterus.”).
204. See id. AI is a broad term that denotes the general method of manual 
insertion of sperm into a woman. See id.; see also Infertility FAQs, CTR. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC), http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/
infertility/ [https://perma.cc/KN8Y-9TS7] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
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Yet another infertility treatment option is surrogacy.205 There 
are two methods of surrogacy—traditional and gestational.206
Traditional surrogacy involves a female who serves as the egg donor 
and carrier and undergoes insemination with the intended father’s 
sperm.207 Conversely, gestational surrogacy involves a female who 
serves as the carrier for a third-party and uses the third-party’s egg 
instead of her own.208 Therefore, the main difference hinges upon 
whether there is a genetic tie between the carrier and the embryo.209
The cost associated with ART varies depending on the elected 
procedures.210 Infertile individuals are faced with a vast array of out-
of-pocket expenses that cause some to sink into debt.211 Illustratively, 
a single round of IVF ranges from $12,000 to $12,400.212 GIFT and 
ZIFT procedures range from $15,000 to $20,000,213 while ICSI is an 
additional $1,500 to the cost of IVF, thus totaling $13,500 to 
205. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 58.
206. See id. at 59.
207. See id. Traditional surrogacy, which is commonly known as donor egg 
or embryo IVF, involves a female egg donor who is inseminated with sperm from 
the intended father, and if fertilization ensues, that female egg donor carries the 
pregnancy to term. See id.
208. See id. (“In gestational surrogacy, the gestational mother carries a 
donated, fertilized egg, sometimes from a donor different from the gestational 
mother and sometimes from the woman who intends to raise the child.”); see also
Anne R. Dana, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for Gay 
Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 353, 360 (2011) (“Surrogacy is a method of 
childbearing that can be used to circumvent . . . structural infertility for gay . . . 
men.”).
209. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 59 (“The distinction between 
the two types of surrogacy is that in traditional surrogacy, the woman carrying the 
fertilized embryo uses her own egg and also carries the baby. A gestational surrogate 
has no genetic link to the child.”).
210. See infra notes 211-216 and accompanying text.
211. See Kimberly Leonard, Who has the Right to Build a Family?, US
NEWS (Aug. 15, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-08-
15/same-sex-infertility-case-exposes-lack-of-access-to-reproductive-treatment 
[https://perma.cc/Q3K2-8MY2] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
212. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 486. However, the average total 
cost projection for In-vitro fertilization is estimated to be $66,667 to $114,286, as 
producing a live birth through the IVF treatment requires multiple cycles. See id.;
see also Fertility Treatment: Getting Started, BABYCENTER,
http://www.babycenter.com/0_fertility-treatment-getting-started_4089.bc 
[https://perma.cc/S93C-KR7W] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
213. See Gamete and Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT and ZIFT) for 
Infertility, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-reproduction/gamete-
and-zygote-intrafallopian-transfer-gift-and-zift-for-infertility 
[https://perma.cc/2REU-W9F2] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
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$13,900.214 The least expensive procedure is AI where a partner’s 
sperm versus donor sperm is used.215 The estimated range for 
gestational and traditional surrogacy is between $50,000 and 
$100,000, but the costs associated with surrogacy vary significantly 
depending on corresponding legal fees, contract fees, medical fees, 
monthly surrogate stipends, and other miscellaneous variables.216
Additionally, donor eggs can cost an additional $15,000 to $20,000, 
so that additional cost must be factored in to procedures where a 
third-party egg is necessary.217 Therefore, since all ART procedures 
carry an associated cost, many who seek ART treatments also seek 
alternative financing, like insurance.218
C. Applicable Infertility Insurance Legislation and Statutes
The federal government and various states have recognized the 
financial impact that infertility treatments have on individuals and 
families.219 In response, some enacted mandates for insurance 
companies to provide for or offer infertility insurance coverage.220
214. See Fertility Treatment: Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI),
BABYCENTER, http://www.babycenter.com/0_fertility-treatment-intracytoplasmic-
sperm-injection-icsi_4097.bc [https://perma.cc/4ATU-E3WP] (last visited Oct. 9, 
2017).
215. See Fertility Treatment: Intrauterine Insemination (IUI), BABYCENTER,
http://www.babycenter.com/0_fertility-treatment-intrauterine-insemination-
iui_4092.bc [https://perma.cc/G4G5-79H5] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
216. For a detailed breakdown of the potential costs associated with 
surrogacy, see Services and Fees, SIMPLE SURROGACY, https://
www.simplesurrogacy.com/service-fees/ [https://perma.cc/Z6JS-726K] (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2017); see also Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 486; Leonard, supra note 
211 (stating that couples face legal issues when they use sperm or eggs from friends 
or acquaintances). See generally Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the 
Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1121, 1137 (2004) (discussing the 
financial implications of ART procedures, like surrogacy).
217. See Pratt, supra note 216, at 1136. Adoption is an alternative to natural 
procreation that allows individuals to achieve parenthood. See Cohen & Chen, supra 
note 170, at 493. However, adoption is not a form of ART and is therefore beyond 
the scope of this Comment.
218. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 152-53. However, the majority of people 
do not have access to infertility insurance. See id. at 152.
219. See id. And if more states provided coverage, more couples could be 
parents. See id.
220. See generally State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility 
Treatment, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (NCSL), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/64UW-282G] 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (summarizing the state statutes that mention any degree of 
infertility insurance coverage). Also, the federal government enacted the ACA, 
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However, not all states have removed the heteronormative language 
within their statutes to broaden the range of qualified recipients.221
The inclusion of infertility insurance coverage in a private 
health insurance plan hinges upon whether governing state law 
requires insurers to provide some form of infertility coverage.222
Fifteen of fifty states currently require insurance coverage, or at least 
the offering of coverage for infertility services, generally.223
However, only two of those fifteen states—California and
Maryland—have amended their statutes to include language allowing 
same-sex couples the ability to obtain coverage as well.224 The 
remaining states denote either heterosexual exclusivity or create an 
ambiguous statutory construction that neither mentions nor excludes 
homosexuals or heterosexuals.225
1. The Homosexually Inclusive State Statutes: California and 
Maryland
California and Maryland explicitly provide for infertility 
insurance in their state statutes; thus, they are the only two 
homosexually inclusive states out of the fifteen that provide for 
infertility insurance.226 Particularly, in 1990, California passed a bill 
to amend its current insurance statute to include a mandate that all 
which mandates that insurance coverage and available medical treatments that are 
offered to heterosexual couples must also be offered to same-sex couples. Health 
Care Coverage Options for Same-Sex Couples, supra note 18. The ACA is 
commonly referred to as “Obamacare.” See id.; see also Leonard, supra note 211
(stating that infertility treatment was contemplated in the original drafting of the 
ACA but was eventually eliminated in the final draft).
221. See generally NCSL, supra note 220. This is notwithstanding the ACAs 
directive. See id.
222. See generally Jacoby, supra note 10, at 152. However, many are critical 
about insurance mandates. See id. at 152-53. It is difficult to get people on board 
with mandated infertility insurance coverage because of associated costs, but also 
because couples may employ ART where they otherwise would not. See id. at 153. 
Yet, many people who support providing infertility insurance consider it an aspect 
of the reproductive autonomy safeguarded by the Constitution. See id.
223. For a detailed synopsis of various state infertility statutes—Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia—
see Blake, supra note 11, at 663-64, 664 n.67.
224. See generally NCSL, supra note 220 (providing summaries of all state 
insurance statutes that mention infertility coverage).
225. See id.
226. See id.
630 Michigan State Law Review 2017
insurance providers must offer infertility insurance coverage.227 As
the law currently stands, all insurers must offer infertility treatment 
coverage, but IVF is exempt from the mandate.228 In 2013, the 
California legislature passed an amendment stating that individuals 
who elect to purchase the option of infertility insurance coverage 
shall be provided the insurance and the care without discrimination 
based on, among other characteristics, domestic partner status or 
sexual orientation.229 The inclusion of this subsection specifically 
disallows the exclusion of same-sex couples.230 Furthermore, 
California’s insurance code provides for criminal consequences for 
anyone who willfully violates the insurance code; thus, denying 
coverage or care based upon domestic partner status or sexual 
orientation can constitute a crime under California law.231
The definition of infertility denoted in the California statute, 
however, still reads like the common definition, as it requires a 
physician-verified condition as a cause of infertility or unsuccessful 
conception or live birth after at least one year of regular, unprotected 
sexual intercourse.232 While this language is the familiar, 
227. See A.B. 460, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2013); see also CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2013); INS. CODE § 10119.6(a).
228. See INS. CODE § 10119.6(a) (“On and after January 1, 1990, every 
insurer issuing, renewing, or amending a policy of disability insurance that covers 
hospital, medical, or surgical expenses on a group basis shall offer coverage of 
infertility treatment, except in vitro fertilization.”).
229. See INS. CODE § 10119.6(g).
Consistent with Section 10140, coverage for the treatment of infertility 
shall be offered and, if purchased, provided without discrimination on the 
basis of age, ancestry, color, disability, domestic partner status, gender, 
gender expression, gender identity, genetic information, marital status, 
national origin, race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. Nothing in this 
subdivision shall be construed to interfere with the clinical judgment of a 
physician and surgeon.
Id.
230. See id.
231. See Assemb. B. 460, Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2013) (stating that a willful 
violation of the insurance code is a crime); see also HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1374.55. However, California’s insurance code exempts IVF coverage. See id. 
Importantly, states that offer, instead of mandate, infertility insurance coverage 
could provide loopholes in employer-provided healthcare plans for the employer to 
select less-expensive plans that do not include infertility coverage. See generally
Leonard, supra note 211.
232. See INS. CODE § 10119.6(b).
For purposes of this section, “infertility” means either (1) the presence of a 
demonstrated condition recognized by a licensed physician and surgeon as 
a cause of infertility, or (2) the inability to conceive a pregnancy or to 
carry a pregnancy to a live birth after a year or more of regular sexual 
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heteronormative language found in the majority of state insurance 
codes, the addition of the language in the 2013 amendment 
seemingly prevents same-sex discrimination, as it forbids 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or domestic partner 
status.233 While the definition of infertility included in the statute 
does not carve out an exception for same-sex couples or define 
homosexual intercourse, at least the elective coverage shall be 
offered for purchase and cannot be denied to individuals based upon 
their domestic partner status or sexual orientation.234 That being said, 
the infertility definition does require “regular sexual relations,” 
which offers two potential interpretations, since “regular” could 
mean consistent, or “regular” could mean conventional, heterosexual 
intercourse.235 However, upon examination of the legislative history, 
a committee report reveals that an example of infertility 
discrimination would be a denial of coverage grounded in an 
individual or a couple not having an opposite sex partner with whom 
they have regular sexual intercourse.236
Similarly, in 2015, Maryland amended its insurance code to 
forbid discrimination against same-sex couples in infertility 
insurance statutes.237 The amendment prohibits entities from 
relations without contraception. “Treatment for infertility” means 
procedures consistent with established medical practices in the treatment 
of infertility by licensed physicians and surgeons, including, but not 
limited to, diagnosis, diagnostic tests, medication, surgery, and gamete 
intrafallopian transfer. “In vitro fertilization” means the laboratory 
medical procedures involving the actual in vitro fertilization process.
Id.
233. See id.; see also INS. CODE § 10119.6(b), (g).
234. See INS. CODE § 10119.6(g).
235. See Regular, M ERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2016).
236. See A.B. 460, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2013). 
The author argues that an example of how the current nondiscrimination 
laws are not being adhered to is when an individual or couple are unable to 
conceive and attempt to access their infertility coverage and are denied 
based on not having an opposite sex married partner with whom to have 
one year of regular sexual relations without conception. The author 
concludes that there are many insurers who currently cover all their 
insured with infertility coverage in their plan and this bill does not affect 
insurers who are in compliance with existing nondiscrimination laws.
Id.
237. See Michelle Andrews, Maryland Revamps Its In Vitro Coverage 
Mandate to Accommodate Same-Sex Couples, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 10, 
2015), http://khn.org/news/maryland-revamps-its-in-vitro-coverage-mandate-to-
accommodate-same-sex-couples [https://perma.cc/Y3TY-WQLM] (“What we were 
interested in was parity and equality. If married opposite-sex couples were entitled 
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requiring same-sex patients to establish a pattern of unsuccessful
conception through heterosexual sexual intercourse in order to 
qualify for infertility treatments.238 Maryland carriers239 are now 
prohibited from discriminating against same-sex couples for 
infertility insurance coverage for treatments other than IVF.240
Additionally, carriers may no longer impose conditions upon same-
sex couples that essentially serve as a prerequisite for insurance 
coverage.241 Prior to this amendment, carriers used the statutory 
ambiguities to continue to deny infertility services to same-sex
couples.242 However, the statute includes a caveat: Same-sex couples 
must attempt six rounds of unsuccessful AI243 for a period of not less 
than two years in order to qualify.244 Therefore, same-sex couples 
must expend at least some economic resources before qualifying for 
infertility insurance coverage in Maryland.245
California and Maryland have modified their infertility 
insurance statutes to align with the needs of their citizens.246
However, the other thirteen state statutes that provide for or at least 
to the benefit, married same-sex married couples should be entitled to it as well.”); 
see also M D. CODE ANN., INS. §15-810(b) (West 2015).
238. See id.
Impermissible requirements – An entity subject to this section that 
provides coverage for infertility benefits other than in vitro fertilization 
may not require as a condition of that coverage, for a patient who is 
married to an individual of the same sex: (1) that the patient’s spouse’s 
sperm be used in the covered treatments or procedures; or (2) that the 
patient demonstrate infertility exclusively by means of a history of 
unsuccessful heterosexual intercourse.
Id.
239. See S. 416, Gen. Assemb., 2015 Sess. (Md. 2015) (analysis of Jennifer 
B. Chasse). Collectively, the term “carriers” encompasses insurers, nonprofit health 
service plans, and health maintenance organizations. See id.
240. See id. (“This bill alters required conditions for [carriers] . . . that 
provide coverage for infertility benefits other than IVF.”).
241. See id. (“Insurers . . . are prohibited from requiring certain conditions of 
coverage for same-sex married couples.”).
242. See id. The bill clarifies that pregnancy-related benefits can no longer 
be denied to “patient[s] whose spouse is of the opposite sex.” Id.
243. See id. Also, carriers are not required to cover costs for donor sperm. 
See id.
244. See id. at 2. Maryland’s fiscal and policy note states that same-sex 
married couples can show “six attempts of artificial insemination over the course of 
two years failing to result in pregnancy.” Id. However, this language exempts male 
same-sex couples, as they cannot be artificially inseminated.
245. See id. at 3.
246. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(g) (West 2013); M D. CODE ANN., INS. §
15-810(b) (West 2015).
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discuss infertility insurance coverage have not modified statutory 
language to account for homosexuals.247 Thus, some statutes 
implicitly exclude homosexuals from insurance coverage because of 
their infertility definition language.248
2. The State Statutes Embodying Heterosexual Exclusivity
In analyzing the pertinent state statutes that provide for 
infertility insurance coverage, no statute expressly excludes 
homosexual individuals.249 Rather, the states effectively do through 
statutory definitions that seem to require either heterosexual 
intercourse for a number of years, or the fertilization of a patient’s 
egg with her spouse’s sperm.250 For example, Connecticut’s statute 
provides for infertility insurance coverage, and it expressly mentions, 
but does not limit, coverage to eight treatments—including IVF, 
GIFT, ZIFT, and IUI.251 Connecticut defines infertility as a 
“condition of a presumably healthy individual who is unable to 
conceive or produce conception or sustain a successful pregnancy 
during a one-year period.”252 While this is not the common 
heteronormative language that mentions heterosexual intercourse, it 
has the effect of discriminating against same-sex couples because the 
one-year period is superfluous.253
247. See generally NCSL, supra note 220. However, states individually 
handle ACA enforcement, so it is up to the state to require insurers to comport with 
the federal directive. See Katie Keith & Kevin Lucia, New Guidance: Federal 
Regulators Allow “Collaborative Arrangements” for ACA Enforcement,
COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
publications/blog/2013/apr/federal-regulators-allow-collaborative-arrangements 
[https://perma.cc/ZFJ4-4ZD9].
248. See NCSL, supra note 220.
249. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 22-23. No state law expressly 
excludes same-sex coverage in its statutory language. See id.
250. See id. at 23. (“To the extent infertility is defined . . . as a failure to 
conceive after some period of unprotected heterosexual inter-course, this definition 
excludes those whose partnering does not include this activity.”).
251. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (2005).
252. Id. Coverage is implicitly limited to heterosexual couples only when 
language like Connecticut’s is included in the statute. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 
11, at 23.
253. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 23. By requiring a period of years 
of unsuccessful, unprotected sexual intercourse, same-sex couples are exempt 
because their sexual relations are non-procreative. See id.
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The Massachusetts statute defines infertility similarly to 
Connecticut and imposes a minimum one-year requirement,254 but it 
only requires generalized insurance policies to include coverage for 
the “medically necessary expenses of diagnosis and treatment of 
infertility.”255 Similarly, Hawaii’s statute provides for a one-time 
benefit for outpatient expenses related to a single IVF procedure, so 
long as, among other requirements, the egg is fertilized with the male 
spouse’s sperm, there is a history of infertility, or there is a medically 
diagnosed infertility condition.256 While the statute’s use of “spouse” 
now encompasses same-sex couples because the only requirement is 
that the couple be legally married, the requirements have the effect 
of discriminating against same-sex couples.257 Meanwhile, the 
Illinois state statute restricts group policy renewals or issuances 
unless the policy provides for, among other treatments, IVF, GIFT, 
ZIFT, or AI.258 Furthermore, the Illinois statute requires insurance 
coverage for IVF, GIFT, and ZIFT only if pregnancy has been 
unsuccessful or unattainable, but, like other statutes, defines 
infertility heteronormatively.259
Alternatively, New Jersey mandates that group insurance 
policies include coverage for, among other services, IVF, AI, GIFT, 
254. See M ASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, §47H (West 2015). The statute does not 
apply if the female is over thirty-five years of age. See id.
255. Id.
256. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 431: 10A-116.5 (2013).
257. See id. This is because the statutory language has the same superfluous 
requirements as the Connecticut statute. See id.; see also supra note 253 and 
accompanying text.
258. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356m(a) (West 2016).
No group policy of accident and health insurance providing coverage for 
more than 25 employees that provides pregnancy related benefits may be 
issued, amended, delivered, or renewed in this State after the effective date 
of this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly unless the policy 
contains coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility including, 
but not limited to, in vitro fertilization, uterine embryo lavage, embryo
transfer, artificial insemination, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, zygote 
intrafallopian tube transfer, and low tubal ovum transfer.
Id.
259. See id. at § 5/356m(c).
For purpose of this Section, ‘infertility’ means the inability to conceive 
after one year of unprotected sexual intercourse, the inability to conceive 
after one year of attempts to produce conception, the inability to conceive 
after an individual is diagnosed with a condition affecting fertility, or the 
inability to sustain a successful pregnancy.
Id.
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ZIFT, and egg retrievals.260 Yet New Jersey also defines infertility in 
a heteronormative fashion, thus leaving no room for a same-sex 
couple loophole.261 New York is proactively trying to increase 
infertility treatment access, passing a bill in 2002 that implemented 
funding for a grant program to make more services available to its 
citizens.262 However, the state’s insurance statute simply prohibits the 
denial of coverage for treatments or conditions resulting in 
infertility,263 and does not require coverage for, among other 
treatments, IVF, GIFT, or ZIFT.264 Moreover, the statute defines 
infertility in accordance with the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (ASRM), which uses the common definition of failure to 
achieve pregnancy after unprotected sexual intercourse for a 
specified period of time.265
Meanwhile, Texas requires health insurance companies who 
provide pregnancy-related benefits to offer or at least provide an 
option for obtaining coverage for outpatient expenditures resulting 
from an IVF procedure.266 However, a further reading of the code 
260. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x(a) (West 2017). However, egg retrievals 
are limited to four per lifetime. See id.
261. See id. (defining infertility as a “disease or condition that results in the 
abnormal function of the reproductive system” such that a person is not able to: 
impregnate another person; conceive after one year of unprotected intercourse if the 
female partner is under 35 years of age and her partner is male, or six months of 
unprotected intercourse if the female partner is 35 years of age or older and her 
partner is male; conceive due to involuntary medical sterility; or carry a pregnancy 
to live birth). For a summary of the statute, see NCSL, supra note 220.
262. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-V1(jj) (Consol. 2017).
263. See INS. § 3216(i)(13)(A)-(B).
264. See § 3221(k)(6)(C)(v).
(I) in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian tube transfers or zygote 
intrafallopian tube transfers; (II) the reversal of elective sterilizations; (III) 
sex change procedures; (IV) cloning; or (V) medical or surgical services 
or procedures that are deemed to be experimental in accordance with 
clinical guidelines referenced in clause (vi) of this subparagraph.
Id.
265. See Infertility: An Overview, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPRODUCTIVE M EDICINE 
(ASRM), https://www.asrm.org/Booklet_Infertility_An_Overview/ (last visited Oct. 
9, 2017).
266. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §1366.003(a) (West 2005).
Subject to this subchapter, an issuer of a group health benefit plan that 
provides pregnancy-related benefits for individuals covered under the plan 
shall offer and make available to each holder or sponsor of the plan 
coverage for services and benefits on an expense incurred, service, or 
prepaid basis for outpatient expenses that arise from in vitro fertilization 
procedures.
Id.
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reveals that the coverage is conditioned upon the fertilization of the 
patient’s eggs with her spouse’s sperm and that the couple has a 
continuous five-year history of infertility due to specified medical 
conditions.267 Yet other state statutes do not mention or implicitly 
distinguish amongst heterosexual or homosexual individuals, thus 
leaving their state statutes open to interpretation.268
3. The Vague and Indeterminate State Statutes
Some state statutes present ambiguity, as they do not explicitly 
or implicitly address the question of coverage for same-sex 
couples.269 Some state statutes are unclear about the general offering 
of infertility insurance or create conditions upon the offering of 
coverage that pose the question on who the insurance may be offered 
to and to what extent it may be offered.270 Illustratively, Arkansas’s 
statute provides a one-sentence mandate for insurance providers to 
cover IVF only and does not include a definition of infertility.271
Montana simply requires Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs), but not other insurers, to provide coverage for “basic health 
services,” which by Montana’s definition include infertility 
services.272 However, like the Arkansas statute, a definition of 
infertility or an elaboration of infertility services is not provided.273
Likewise, West Virginia’s statute requires HMOs to cover “basic 
267. See § 1366.005(2)-(3)(A)-(D).
(2) the fertilization or attempted fertilization of the patient’s oocytes is 
made only with the sperm of the patient’s spouse; (3) the patient and the 
patient’s spouse have a history of infertility of at least five continuous 
years’ duration or the infertility is associated with: (A) endometriosis; 
(B) exposure in utero to diethylstilbestrol (DES); (C) blockage of or 
surgical removal of one or both fallopian tubes; or (D) oligospermia.
Id.
268. See NCSL, supra note 220.
269. See id.
270. See Blake, supra note 11, at 663-65 & n.67 (describing state statutes 
that discuss infertility coverage generally).
271. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-86-118(a) (West 2001) (“All accident and 
health insurance companies doing business in this state shall include, as a covered 
expense, in vitro fertilization.”).
272. See M ONT. CODE ANN. §33-31-102(3)(h)(v) (West 2011).
273. See id. Since there are no parameters provided, a reasonable statutory 
interpretation or broad reading of the statute could create an inference that infertility 
treatment coverage for same-sex couples is included, especially since the ACA 
requires coverage to be equal for both heterosexual and homosexual persons. See id.
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health care services,” which include infertility services, but does not 
provide further explanation.274
Similarly, Ohio requires health insurance corporations to 
provide “basic health care services,” which include preventative 
health care services that encompass infertility services.275 However, 
the mandate adds the caveat that the coverage shall only be provided 
when medically necessary, which leaves the statute open for 
interpretation in regard to its applicability to same-sex couples.276
Likewise, Rhode Island requires coverage for infertility-related 
coverage, but only when medically necessary.277 However, the statute
defines infertility as the condition of a married individual who is 
otherwise healthy but who cannot conceive or sustain a pregnancy 
for at least one year.278 Rhode Island also caps off the mandatory 
coverage at $100,000.279
Lastly, three states do not necessarily fit into any identifiable 
statutory category, but do discuss infertility or ART in their 
insurance statutes, while not necessarily mandating coverage or the 
offering of coverage.280 Louisiana’s statute explicitly prevents 
insurers from excluding coverage for the treatment and diagnosis of 
an otherwise insurable medical condition solely because the 
condition was the result of infertility.281 However, the statute further 
specifies that it cannot be read to require coverage for certain 
infertility treatments.282 Additionally, Minnesota explicitly excludes 
coverage for fertility drugs if the drugs are for the purpose of 
enhancing fertility.283 Moreover, Utah’s statute is unique, as it 
requires insurance providers to offer coverage for maternity benefits 
274. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §33-25A-2(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
275. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1751.01 (A)(1)(h) (LexisNexis 1991).
276. See id.
277. See 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-30-(a) (West 2017).
278. See § 18-30-(b).
279. See § 18-30-(g).
280. See NCSL, supra note 220.
281. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1036(A)(1) (2001) (“Any health insurance 
policy, contract, or plan specified in Subsection B of this Section which is issued for 
delivery, delivered, renewed, or otherwise contracted for in this state on or after 
January 1, 2002, shall not exclude coverage for diagnosis and treatment of a 
correctable medical condition otherwise covered by the policy, contract, or plan 
solely because the condition results in infertility.”).
282. See § 22:1036(A)(2)(a)-(c) (“This Section shall not be construed to 
require coverage of the following: (a) Fertility drugs. (b) In vitro fertilization or any 
other assisted reproductive technique. (c) Reversal of a tubal ligation, a vasectomy,
or any other method of sterilization.”).
283. See M INN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625(13)(a) (West 2017).
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and for an adoption subsidy of $4,000 if a child is placed for 
adoption within ninety days of its birth.284 However, the statute also 
provides the option to apply that $4,000 subsidy to the cost of 
infertility treatments instead of reimbursement for adoption 
expenditures, if the insured so chooses.285
Of the fifteen state statutes examined, only California and 
Maryland neutralize their statutory language to eliminate infertility 
insurance discrimination.286 However, while the California and 
Maryland state statutes are similarly applicable to homosexuals, 
there is a nuanced difference—California’s statute requires the 
offering of infertility treatment insurance coverage, while Maryland 
obligates carriers to provide coverage.287 However, the other thirteen 
states whose insurance statutes provide for variations of infertility 
insurance coverage have yet to amend their language to account for a 
substantial number of ART utilizers—homosexual persons—or have 
a definitional aspect that exempts homosexuals from obtaining the 
coverage.288
Conclusively, infertility treatments are exceptionally costly, 
inaccessible to some, and yet in high demand by many.289 The 
284. See Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, UTAH ST.
LEGISLATURE, http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills/static/HB0347.html [https://perma.cc/
6QC3-U7UF] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017); see also NCSL, supra note 220.
285. See NCSL, supra note 220 (“The law was amended to allow an enrollee 
to obtain infertility treatments rather than seek reimbursement for an adoption.”).
286. See generally id. (summarizing Maryland and California’s statutory 
language).
287. See id. See generally Health Insurance 101, RESOLVE, 
http://resolve.org/what-are-my-options/insurance-coverage/health-insurance-101/ 
[https://perma.cc/8D4Z-JRNG] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (“Mandate to Cover: is a 
law requiring that health insurance companies provide coverage of infertility 
treatment as a benefit included in every policy (policy premium includes cost of 
infertility treatment coverage). Mandate to Offer: is a law requiring that health 
insurance companies make available for purchase a policy which offers coverage of 
infertility treatment (but the law does not require employers to pay for the infertility 
treatment coverage.”).
288. See Blake, supra note 11, at 665 (“For the most part, state insurance 
mandates based on external factors apply equally to all individuals. . . . [However], 
it is those laws that use internal factors to determine insurance coverage that are 
most significant with respect to the rights of gay . . . persons.”).
289. See id. at 658-61. “[T]here is a strong current of structurally infertile 
groups making use of ART.” Id. at 658. However, given the costly barriers for ART 
treatments, the system is “inherently inequitable” because “only a fortunate few can 
afford to spend [thousands] in order to have a chance at a baby [so] [m]any couples 
are forced out of the baby business from the outset.” Id. at 661. Yet, the high 
demand for ART persists. See id.
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statutory definitions of infertility in the overwhelming majority of 
states that define it exclude same-sex couples from insurance 
coverage.290 While the majority of states do not provide for infertility 
insurance coverage, the states that do should not discriminate against 
same-sex couples.291 Therefore, a redefinition of infertility is not only 
imperative in achieving procreative equality, but is also necessitated 
pursuant to Obergefell and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses.292
III. THE NECESSITY OF REDEFINITION
The Constitution forbids sheer discrimination, especially when 
there is not a legitimate government interest justifying the 
inequality.293 Therefore, laws that hinder same-sex couples from 
acquiring infertility insurance to reduce the costliness of ART 
procedures should be deemed unconstitutional, as the laws 
effectively discriminate against same-sex couples without 
justification.294 Same-sex couples have the same compelling desire to 
have children; thus, without a valid, legal foundation for such 
discrimination—notwithstanding the untenable societal 
condemnation—laws that limit ART coverage to heterosexual 
couples are unconstitutional pursuant to the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses.295 However, instead of requiring affected same-
290. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 24 (discussing the implicit 
definitional exclusions in state insurance statutes).
291. See Blake, supra note 11, at 662. Proposals for mandated insurance 
coverage to reduce the discriminatory impact of insurance statutes that exclude 
unpopular groups have been introduced, as the need for intervention is obvious and 
recognized. See id. at 661.
292. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Aloni & 
Daar, supra note 11. For a similar perspective regarding same-sex couples and 
biological parenthood, see generally Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood,
126 YALE L.J. 2260 (2017). However, Professor NeJaime states that equal 
protection and due process claims may not come to fruition for quite some time. Id.
at 2270. (“[R]eform will likely require constitutional oversight. While scholars have 
addressed constitutional limitations on government regulation of family formation 
through ART, the issues of parental recognition uncovered in this Article gesture 
toward a set of constitutional questions in both equal protection and due process that 
will take years to fully emerge and develop.”).
293. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see also supra notes 88-
91 and accompanying text. 
294. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35 (declaring laws that target the unpopular 
homosexual community are unconstitutional).
295. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2604. The Supreme Court stated that 
both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses will continue to remedy 
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sex couples to bring a lawsuit to address the infertility insurance 
discrimination, states that offer infertility insurance coverage should 
amend their prejudicial statutory language to ensure compliance with 
the Fourteenth Amendment and with the underlying principle in 
Obergefell: that same-sex couples must be on equal footing with 
heterosexual couples generally,296 but especially in the institution of 
marriage.297
A. Existing Statutory Structure and Heteronormative Definitions 
Offend Obergefell
Obergefell dictates the transcendent importance of children 
within the institution of marriage; thus, statutory construction that 
exudes heteronormativity and inhibits same-sex couples from 
achieving biological parenthood runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s 
directive for sweeping equality regardless of sexual orientation.298 By 
narrowly construing infertility as a medical issue, states ignore 
Obergefell’s principle that fundamental aspects of personhood 
evolve as society changes.299 After the Obergefell decision, it is clear 
that the Supreme Court is moving towards unequivocal equalization 
of same-sex couples’ rights.300 Justice Kennedy’s powerful language 
proves that homosexual discrimination has no place in today’s 
society.301 Thus, current infertility definitions that denote 
heteronormativity are out of touch with twenty-first century norms.302
inequities within the institution of marriage. See id. at 2603. It is obvious that the 
Supreme Court considers childbearing and familial formation integral aspects of the 
institution of marriage, which is evidenced by their declaration that the 
constitutional right to marry has many aspects—one of which is childbearing. See id.
at 2601. 
296. See id. at 2608. The Constitution grants same-sex couples equal dignity 
in the eyes of the law. See id.
297. See id. at 2595 (stating that same-sex couples seek the privileges 
associated with the institution of marriage).
298. See id. at 2608 (declaring that family is a paramount paradigm within 
the institution of marriage); see also supra note 295 and accompanying text.
299. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2603-04 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)) (stating that liberty “extend[s] to personal choices central 
to individual dignity and autonomy” and that “new insights and societal 
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within . . . fundamental institutions” 
like marriage).
300. See id. at 2608 (“They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The 
Constitution grants them that right.”).
301. See, e.g., id. at 2599 (“The four principles and traditions . . . 
demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply 
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1. The Outdated Heteronormativity of Infertility Definitions
Heteronormative infertility definitions have the effect of 
excluding same-sex couples.303 While the definition of infertility may 
vary trivially across insurance statutes, the definition generally 
denotes infertility as a disease or medical condition that impacts a 
man or a woman’s reproductive system and consequently impedes 
the ability of conception.304 The majority of states that provide for 
infertility insurance coverage implicitly or explicitly exempt same-
sex couples through their heteronormative definition of infertility.305
While the language does not blatantly disallow homosexuals from 
obtaining insurance coverage, by requiring heterosexual intercourse 
for a period of years, the language can be interpreted to exclude 
same-sex couples because they will never be able to satisfy the 
definitional or medical thresholds; thus, such definitions are contrary 
to contemporary understandings of marriage and family.306
The vital role of families and children in the Obergefell
decision evidences the Supreme Court’s appreciation for the familial 
aspect of marriage.307 Particularly, by stating that childbearing is an 
with equal force to same-sex couples.”). Other freedoms like expression and 
intimacy hold true for all individuals regardless of their sexual orientation. See id.
“There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples.” Id. at 2601. “If 
rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received practices could 
serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights 
once denied.” Id. at 2602.
302. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 23-24. Heteronormative ART 
definitions effectively preempt same-sex couples from desired family formation. See 
id. After the legalization of same-sex marriage, a multitude of laws need reform in 
order to fully accomplish Obergefell’s central premise. See id.
303. See id.
304. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (West 2015) (“[Infertility is] a
presumably healthy individual who is unable to conceive or produce conception or 
sustain a successful pregnancy during a one-year period.”); M ASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
175, § 47H (“[I]nfertility mean[s] the condition of an individual who is unable to 
conceive or produce conception during a period of one year if the female is under 
the age of 35, or during a period of six months if the female is over the age of 35.”); 
see also Pratt, supra note 9, at 1286-87; NCSL, supra note 220 (summarizing 
infertility insurance statutes).
305. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 24. The definitional aspect of 
infertility statutes excludes non-procreative partnering. See id.
306. See id. at 25 (“The legal battle over marriage equality produced a few 
opportunities for the creation of a more pluralistic structure of family law—one that 
offers several institutions for legal recognition of relationships that fit the needs of
diverse family structures.”).
307. See supra notes 61, 67-73 and accompanying text.
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integral part of a marriage, that marriage safeguards families and 
children, and that the marital union uniquely exemplifies the 
paradigms of love and family, it follows that any discriminatory 
barrier to the attainment of parenthood offends Obergefell. 308
Namely, the fact that same-sex couples are structurally infertile 
cannot exempt them from biological parenthood, especially since 
alternative options—specifically ART—are available.309 However, 
astronomical costs accompany ART procedures.310 Thus, same-sex 
couples who are not wealthy, or are without disposable income, are 
essentially prevented from employing ART procedures because most 
states do not afford them the option of obtaining infertility insurance 
to curb the financial impact.311 Hence, heteronormative language 
precludes most same-sex couples’ procurement of biological 
parenthood, which is a privilege within the confines of marriage that 
Obergefell declares same-sex couples should enjoy equally.312
The critics of Obergefell oppose conscripting states into same-
sex marriage and disagree with extending the fundamental right to 
marry to same-sex couples, mostly because they focus on the archaic
definition of marriage as a marital union between a man and a 
woman and on the non-procreative aspect of homosexual sex.313 The 
dissent further implicates that children are better off if sexual 
308. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). Marriage 
involves protections and benefits to children that are so material and immeasurable 
that barring same-sex couples from capitalizing them is contradictory to children’s 
best interest. See id.
309. See DAAR, supra note 177, at 474 (“Thus, ART opens up the prospect 
of parenthood . . . to those whose family structure is something other than a 
heterosexual couple. [S]ame-sex couples can look to ART to enable them to become 
parents, often fulfilling a dream of biological parenthood that was . . . unavailable a 
generation ago.”).
310. See supra notes 211-217 and accompanying text.
311. See Blake, supra note 11, at 659-62 (explaining the costs of certain 
ART procedures and how other countries improve ART access by financing 
treatments). Inability to receive ART treatments hinges upon financial access. See 
id. at 661.
312. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. Furthermore, because of the 
immutability associated with homosexuality, same-sex marriage is the only avenue 
for same-sex couples to attain the associated benefits that follow from the 
commitment of marriage. See id.
313. See id. at 2613. (Roberts, J., Scalia, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Procreation occurs through sexual relations between a man and a woman.”). 
Interestingly, the dissent cites numerous definitions of marriage as a two-person 
union between a man and a woman, but most of the sources come from the 1800s or 
early 1900s. See id. at 2614.
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relations only occur between a man and a woman.314 However, the 
majority opinion cites psychological research that rebuts arguments 
that children who grow up with same-sex parents experience harm.315
Furthermore, by the dissent focusing on the procreative aspect of 
marital relations, it implies that married couples have a duty to 
procreate.316 The majority, however, correctly points out that 
childbearing is only one aspect of marital autonomy,317 which is why 
the option should be afforded to all married couples equally.
Contemporary society no longer defines marriage as a union
between a man and a woman, and family structure no longer denotes 
a heteronormative construction;318 therefore, infertility can no longer 
hinge upon heterosexual connotations either.319 This nation’s highest 
court found that the marital union, which is now equally accessible 
to same-sex couples, safeguards childrearing and procreation, which 
lie at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment.320 Thus, the structural 
infertility associated with homosexuality cannot serve as a 
disqualifier for a same-sex couple to obtain the biological tie to their 
children that heterosexual couples enjoy.321
Therefore, states that offer infertility insurance to heterosexual 
couples, but do not leave room for the inclusion of same-sex couples, 
run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment and Obergefell. 322 Hence, 
redefining infertility and removing the associated medical necessity 
characteristics from the definition is imperative.323 Thus, states that 
314. See id. at 2613. (“Therefore, for the good of children . . . sexual 
relations that can lead to procreation should occur only between a man and a woman 
committed to a lasting bond.”).
315. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
316. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (discussing the importance of 
procreative sexual relations within the institution of marriage for continuing the 
human race). 
317. See id. at 2600-01 (stating that childbearing is one of the four principles 
and decisions of marriage).
318. See supra notes 61, 67-73 and accompanying text (detailing the familial 
reasons for legalizing same-sex marriage).
319. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 26 (“Now that same-sex marriage 
rights have been secured, we could think again about how to make family law more 
pluralistic and accommodating for diverse types of families.”).
320. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (stating that the third principle—that 
marriage safeguards families and children—finds its legal basis in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
321. See DAAR, supra note 177, at 474; see also note 308 and accompanying 
text.
322. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Aloni & Daar, supra note 11.
323. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(g) (West 2013); M D. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 15-810(b) (West 2016) (allowing same-sex infertility insurance coverage).
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do not offer infertility coverage should be compelled to do so, like 
California.324
2. California Almost Got It Right—Follow California…With 
One Exception
The California infertility insurance statute should be considered 
the model statute for all states,325 but especially those that currently 
provide infertility insurance coverage for heterosexual couples
generally.326 The California statute does not mandate that insurers 
actually provide the coverage; rather, the statute mandates that 
insurers offer coverage for purchase as an addition to a preexisting 
health insurance plan.327 However, the statute exempts IVF coverage, 
which is the most successful and sought after ART procedure.328
Therefore, states should adopt California’s statute without the IVF 
exemption.
Offering infertility insurance coverage allows same-sex 
couples, both gay and lesbian, to tailor their health insurance plans 
appropriately in order to satisfy their structural infertility needs.329 It 
is more likely that states will agree to a less intensive statutory 
proposal than one that conscripts them into providing the coverage.330
Thus, despite employer-provided plans locating a potential 
loophole—to select less expensive plans that do not include the 
infertility insurance coverage—at least individuals and couples will 
have the option to obtain the coverage within their state.331 While this 
may be more expensive for the insured, it will undoubtedly be less 
expensive than paying for ART out-of-pocket, given the cost and 
added expenditures associated with each procedure.332
324. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(a).
325. See id.
326. See generally NCSL, supra note 220 (describing the state infertility 
statutes).
327. See INS. CODE § 10119.6(a).
328. See id.; see also Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 490. IVF is the most 
prevalent ART procedure. See id. However, individuals usually do multiple rounds 
of IVF, which compounds the financial burden. See id. at 492.
329. See Leonard, supra note 211 (discussing the massive debt individuals 
acquire in seeking ART treatments); see also Jacoby, supra note 10, at 152-53
(stating the variety of issues critics have regarding health insurance mandates).
330. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 153 (discussing how mandating insurance 
will be costly and a “hard sell”).
331. See generally Leonard, supra note 211.
332. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 154-64 (outlining the financing options 
and associated costs with financing ART). Furthermore, insurance companies and 
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Another positive highlight within the California statute is found 
in the absence of an insurance coverage ceiling on the amount of 
infertility insurance coverage that may be paid.333 Some statutes limit 
the amount of coverage to a total of $100,000, which seems 
generous,334 but when analyzed beside the ART options and their 
respective costs, that amount only skims the surface of the cost of 
some ART procedures.335 Most ART treatments require multiple 
attempts before proving successful, which means that the cost of one 
procedure, which may seem financially attainable when isolated, can 
easily multiply and ultimately become unaffordable.336
Since ART procedure success is not guaranteed, and a given 
procedure may take multiple attempts before proving successful—
which could easily absorb the allotted amount of coverage without 
ever obtaining a pregnancy that is carried to live birth—it follows 
that statutes should not limit insurance coverage to an amount that 
will not cover some of the most common ART procedures. 337 At an 
increased price, insurance providers could tailor insurance plans to 
fit the insured’s needs.338 However, the issue with the California 
statute is that it exempts IVF coverage,339 which is one of the most 
employers should not be required to finance additional, overly burdensome elective 
insurance, because that could open doors to the inclusion of other elective 
procedures. See id. at 155. Even so, insurance never covers the entire cost of a 
procedure, so those with private health insurance plans will always incur costs to an
extent. See id.
333. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(g) (West 2013).
334. See, e.g., 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-30-(g) (West 2017); M D. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 15-810(e) (West 2016).
335. See, e.g., Cohen & Chen, supra note 170. This is because of the high 
cost associated with the more popular and successful procedures of IVF and 
surrogacy. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149-50 (“[O]ne round of IVF or related 
processes far exceeds what an average household of four spends out of pocket on 
health care for an entire year. Employing a gestational surrogate costs tens of 
thousands of dollars.”).
336. For example, statistics demonstrate that IVF and surrogacy can easily 
accumulate a total north of $100,000. See supra notes 212-220 and accompanying 
text (discussing ART procedures, their success rates, and accompanying costs).
337. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170; Fertility Treatment: Getting 
Started, supra note 212; Services and Fees, supra note 216; Sunderam, supra note 
181.
338. See Health Insurance 101, supra note 287; cf. supra notes 186, 218-223
and accompanying text (discussing the downfalls of insurance mandates).
339. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 491 (stating that individuals 
usually do multiple rounds of IVF, which compounds the financial burden).
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successful, yet expensive, ART procedures available.340 While it is 
understandable that a statutory mandate to offer IVF coverage could 
be burdensome, if the purpose of the statute is to provide individuals 
with the choice to purchase infertility insurance,341 then all forms of 
ART should be available at the right price.342
B. Financial Implications of State Mandated Insurance Coverage
Providing infertility insurance coverage to both heterosexual 
and homosexual couples will be costly, which may deter some states 
from reforming their insurance statutes.343 Since cost is the main 
barrier to achieving biological parenthood, aside from the structural 
infertility component, it logically follows that wealthier same-sex 
couples that enjoy disposable income may have more accessibility to 
biological parenthood through ART treatments.344 However, that 
leaves less fortunate same-sex couples to either struggle to produce 
the necessary funds to achieve a biological tie to their children or 
relinquish the possibility altogether.345 Furthermore, male same-sex 
couples face a severer financial impact, as without the necessary 
female reproductive organs, their ART options are constrained to 
surrogacy.346
340. See id. at 492. The total cost of producing a live birth through IVF 
procedures ranges from $66,667 to $114,286. See id.
341. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6(g) (West 2013); see supra notes 236-237
and accompanying text (discussing California’s and Maryland’s insurance statutes 
and their applicability to same-sex couples).
342. See generally Health Insurance 101, supra note 287 (discussing 
mandates to offer and mandates to cover).
343. See id.
344. See generally Cohen & Chen, supra note 170 (discussing the costliness 
of certain ART procedures). Since costs are so astronomical, individuals may be 
forced to employ less effective ART procedures to attempt to achieve biological 
parenthood. See Pratt, supra note 216, at 1137.
345. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 57. While ART does provide 
same-sex couples with the ability to obtain biological parenthood, the associated 
monetary aspect is burdensome. See id.
346. See Pratt, supra note 216, at 1129 (“Infertility deprives would-be 
parents of an ‘experience that is central to . . . identity and meaning in life.’”); see 
also Dana, supra note 208, at 360 (discussing surrogacy and how it is the only ART 
option for male same-sex couples to achieve biological parenthood).
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1. Cost Versus Benefit: Does it Matter?
Same-sex couples experience “direct and indirect barriers to 
ART.”347 The high cost associated with infertility insurance coverage 
is unquestionable and is why most insurers refuse to provide 
coverage.348 However, states recognize the astronomical costs of 
ART treatments; thus, they should utilize their regulatory powers 
over insurance companies and mandate the coverage.349
Insurance companies cite a few main arguments for their denial 
of infertility insurance coverage.350 The underlying reason, however, 
seems to revolve around the cost.351 Mandating insurance coverage 
for ART will be pricey, so insurers may cross-subsidize the 
additional cost throughout all insured persons to curb their financial 
burden.352 However, insurers also deny that infertility is an illness, 
which justifies their denial of ART insurance coverage,353 because 
347. See Pratt, supra note 9, at 1337.
348. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 77-78. (“Insurers often cite 
skyrocketing costs as a reason for not providing coverage for infertility 
treatments.”).
349. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 486-87 (suggesting that states 
should use their police powers to impose insurance mandates for ART coverage). 
However, the government does not recognize positive rights all that often, and to do 
so requires a showing of history of discrimination, political powerlessness, and 
immutability. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 714. However, if reproduction or 
even ART were considered positive rights, “it would reinforce claims that a state 
mandate excluding groups with structural or medico-structural infertility from 
mandated insurance is a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation.” Blake, 
supra note 11, at 683.
350. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 77-81 (elaborating on insurers 
main arguments for the denial of insurance coverage). 
351. See id. at 77 (discussing the financial burdens of ART).
352. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 487 (“A number of states have 
attempted to improve access . . . through their regulatory powers over insurance, 
making IVF a mandated benefit such that health insurers are required to cover IVF 
in their plans, thus cross-subsidizing the costs across all insured individuals.”). If 
infertility insurance coverage was mandated, the estimated cost could increase to 
approximately $105 to $175 per year. See John C. Goodman & Merrill Matthews, 
Jr., The Cost of Health Insurance Mandates, NCPA (Aug. 13, 1997), 
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba237 [https://perma.cc/AX6M-MCYV]. But see Cohen & 
Chen, supra note 170, at 507-08 (stating that IVF mandates may only increase 
insurance premiums by $3.14 per year).
353. See Baron & Bazzell, supra note 177, at 78. (“One argument insurers 
make in defense of their denials of coverage is that, while improper function of 
reproductive organs may be an illness, infertility is not.”).
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coverage is typically reserved for treating illnesses exclusively.354
Moreover, insurers argue that ART procedures are not of medical 
necessity and are elective, or alternatively that the procedures are 
experimental, and thus excluded from coverage.355 However, these 
arguments make a sweeping generalization about infertility and 
ignore the immutable structural infertility that same-sex couples 
experience—which belies that the procedures are unnecessary or 
elective.356 Also, structural infertility is not grounded in a medical 
diagnosis—it lies at the heart of the immutability of sexual 
orientation,357 which is why infertility can no longer be viewed 
strictly as a medical issue under the law. Thus, the remaining 
justification insurers provide is the associated cost.358 However, high 
costs cannot justify an outright denial of infertility coverage, 
especially where coverage is offered to heterosexual couples but 
denied to same-sex couples.359
State powers encompass regulating for the health of its people, 
which provides state governments with the power to regulate 
insurance as they see fit.360 However, a state’s role in promoting for 
the health of its people involves ensuring equal access to 
opportunities that allow them to purse their life goals of biological
354. See id. (“Therefore, because insurance plans only provide coverage for 
‘illnesses,’ procedures used to change an infertile condition are not compensable.”). 
Insurance companies also deny that artificial insemination is a treatment for
correcting infertility. See id.
355. See id. at 79. The argument is grounded in the fact that infertility 
treatments are not necessary to preserve an insured’s health. See id. Also, insurers 
believe that “procedures that circumvent a problem area instead of permanently 
correcting underlying physical problems should not be considered medically 
necessary.” Id. A court determination that ART procedures are not simply elective is 
necessary. See id.
356. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 714 (discussing that immutable 
characteristics warrant heightened scrutiny).
357. See Pratt, supra note 9, at 1286-87 (discussing the definition of 
infertility under the law); see also Jacoby, supra note 10, at 149 (defining structural 
infertility as encompassing individuals who do not participate in heterosexual 
intercourse).
358. See generally Cohen & Chen, supra note 170 (explaining the 
implications of additional insurance costs and why insurers ground their denial of 
insurance coverage in increased premiums).
359. See id. at 508 (“Whether an increase in premiums is a good reason not 
to adopt these insurance mandates might depend on where precisely in that range the 
cost increase falls.”).
360. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 152 (discussing how states could use their 
regulatory powers to mandate insurance coverage).
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parenthood.361 Infertility is a departure from normal individual 
functioning because it impedes the basic function of procreation, so 
state insurance mandates that increased access to ART for same-sex 
couples to achieve biological parenthood would be a proper use of 
state regulatory powers.362 However, male same-sex couples face a 
heightened barrier to ART, as their biological parenthood hinges 
upon surrogacy—the costliest procedure.363
2. But, What About the Fathers? 
Perceptibly, ART options for male same-sex couples are more 
limited than those of female same-sex couples.364 An obvious issue 
with homosexual males and procreation is that their reproductive 
system does not enable them to carry a child.365 However, that 
immutability cannot discharge male same-sex couples’ ability to 
achieve biological parenthood.366 While not discounting the 
tumultuous journey undertaken by female same-sex couples, their 
ability to obtain sperm to fertilize their eggs and enjoy a biological 
tie to their children is a more affordable and attainable endeavor than 
that of male same-sex couples.367
Male same-sex couples must resort to surrogacy to achieve 
biological parenthood, and surrogacy is one of the costliest ART 
361. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 170, at 502 (“[A] state’s role in 
promoting health . . . [is] a matter of political justice, to ensure access to the ‘normal 
opportunity range’ to purse the ‘array of life plans reasonable persons are likely to 
develop for themselves.”).
362. See id. (“‘[I]nfertility is a departure from normal functioning that 
reduces an individual’s fair share of the normal opportunity range and gives rise to 
claims for assistance’ because infertility interferes with ‘basic functions of free and 
equal citizens, such as reproducing themselves biologically, an aspect of plans of life 
that reasonable people commonly pursue.’”). Moreover, state action is justified 
because human welfare warrants it. See id. at 503.
363. See Dana, supra note 208, at 360 (discussing the fact that surrogacy is 
the only ART option for gay men).
364. See generally id. (discussing male same-sex couples and their 
experiences with surrogacy).
365. See id.
366. The Krupas’ lawsuit advocated only for the women of New Jersey to 
obtain motherhood and left out the possibility for the men of New Jersey to obtain 
fatherhood. See generally Complaint, supra note 1.
367. See Dana, supra note 208. Gay couples have the same desire for 
biological parenthood and cannot be discriminated against in the context of ART. 
See id. at 372-73.
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procedures.368 However, to add to the existing financial and structural 
infertility barriers, surrogacy requires male same-sex couples to 
locate a willing and able third-party female to serve as their 
surrogate—which is difficult because there are not necessarily an 
abundance of females lining up to carry someone else’s child.369
Consequently, the male same-sex couple must also economically 
support that gestational carrier at least throughout the term of her 
pregnancy, which compounds the already-existing financial 
burden.370
However, coverage that makes it more difficult for males to
obtain biological parenthood versus females violates equal 
protection.371 While on its face a law may not be discriminatory if it 
provides for same-sex couples’ ability to obtain infertility insurance, 
the law’s effect will discriminate against male same-sex couples and 
infringe upon their ability to obtain biological parenthood more than 
female same-sex couples.372 Where the government confers benefits, 
it must do so equally.373 The issue with an equal protection challenge, 
though, is that the law’s purpose will not be to discriminate against 
male same sex couples; thus, the laws will probably not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.374
368. See supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text (detailing surrogacy 
costs).
369. See generally Dana, supra note 208. However, some women agree to be 
surrogates because (1) “they like being pregnant,” (2) “they want the money, and” 
(3) “they view having a baby for a childless couple as providing an altruistic gift.” 
Id. at 364.
370. See Pratt, supra note 216, at 1156. The additional costs of using a 
surrogate include the surrogate’s fee, the surrogate’s medical expenses, and potential 
attorneys’ fees. See id.
371. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 713. Equal Protection forbids 
discrimination on the basis of gender. See id.
372. See Blake, supra note 11, at 683-84 (“[V]iolations of Equal Protection 
do not always require that the law classify a group and discriminate on its face.”).
373. See Equal Protection, supra note 90 (explaining that Equal Protection 
requires states to treat similarly situated persons equally).
374. See Blake, supra note 11, at 684 (explaining that Equal Protection is 
violated if there is evidence of discriminatory intent). However, since private 
insurance is in play, insurers have free reign to formulate their policy inclusions as 
they see fit. See id. at 677-78. While a claim against an insurance company for not 
conferring benefits equally may pose a gender discrimination issue, it is difficult to 
argue that increased insurance coverage is necessary to ensure males can attain 
biological parenthood. See generally id. This is because the coverage amount will 
also have to be equally accessible to females or that may pose another gender 
discrimination issue. See generally id. However, since cost alone cannot justify not 
providing insurance benefits, insurance companies must formulate individual 
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Since surrogacy could cost a male same-sex couple over 
$100,000, it is nonsensical that male same-sex couples should not be 
able to attain their goal of having a family and genetic ties to their 
children simply because the out-of-pocket expenditures are 
astronomical.375 Therefore, infertility insurance plans should offer 
coverage for surrogacy, or at least increase the coverage cap to allow 
same-sex couples, especially males, to achieve biological 
parenthood.376
C. Redefinition After Obergefell: Why Equal Protection and Due 
Process Dictate Redefinition
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy enumerated four principles and 
traditions that establish the underlying reasons why marriage is a 
fundamental right.377 The third principle—that the fundamental right 
to marry protects children and families, which draws meaning from 
the related rights of childrearing and procreation—incorporates the 
core Equal Protection and Due Process principles relating to the 
liberties of marriage, the establishment of a home, and the rearing of 
children.378 Therefore, the Supreme Court realizes the significance of 
children and their importance in building a family unit,379 and same-
sex couples and heterosexual couples alike consider children to be an
important piece of marriage and family.380 Marriage equality finally 
policies to accommodate the varying needs of both male and female same-sex 
couples. See generally Cohen & Chen, supra note 176. A way to do this is by 
offering male same-sex couples an option to purchase an insurance policy for 
surrogacy coverage specifically. See generally Jacoby, supra note 10. While this 
might require male same-sex couples to pay more for insurance coverage, the cost of 
their insurance premiums will still be less than it would be to pay for surrogacy out-
of-pocket. See supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text. See generally Dana, 
supra note 208 (discussing surrogacy barriers for male same-sex couples).
375. See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text. See generally Dana, 
supra note 208.
376. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
377. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599-01 (2015) (explaining 
the four principles and traditions of marriage that justify extending the fundamental 
right to same-sex couples).
378. See id. at 2600. Same-sex couples want the privileges that accompany 
marriage—childbearing is one of them. See id.
379. See id.
380. See, e.g., Ikemoto, supra note 10, at 1055-56; see also Orentlicher, 
supra note 168, at 653 (“Gay couples have the same strong interest as heterosexual 
couples in raising children with whom they have biological ties.”).
652 Michigan State Law Review 2017
came after many years of discrimination, oppression, and cruelty.381
The right to marry, which encompasses familial properties, may no 
longer be denied to same-sex couples pursuant to the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses,382 so it follows that the 
associated right to procreate—which is a correlating privilege of 
marriage—cannot be infringed either.
1. Equal Protection Necessitates Equal Opportunity for 
Infertility Insurance Coverage
Equal protection prohibits laws from granting a right to some, 
but not to others, yet it also mandates that the government shall treat 
similarly situated persons equally.383 Same-sex couples are no longer 
discriminated against within the institution of marriage because of 
Obergefell, which positioned same-sex couples on equal footing with 
heterosexual couples.384 In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy explicitly 
stated that childbearing is an integral aspect of marriage.385
Furthermore, Skinner established in the 1940s that procreation is a 
fundamental right.386 Therefore, it can be inferred that those who are 
accorded the fundamental right to marry cannot have their ability to 
obtain biological parenthood disregarded.387
The argument under Equal Protection would be stronger if the 
Supreme Court declared sexual orientation a suspect classification.388
However, utilizing the reasoning from Lawrence, an argument can be 
formulated that sexual orientation is treated like a protected class 
under the law, thus equally deserving of the associated constitutional 
381. See ABRAMS ET. AL., supra note 28, at 89 (detailing the evolution of 
homosexual rights).
382. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (holding that same-sex marriage is 
legal).
383. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 712, 935 (discussing the 
requirements of Equal Protection). 
384. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. (“They ask for equal dignity in the 
eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”).
385. See id. at 2600.
386. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942) (outlawing 
sterilizations and declaring procreation as a fundamental right).
387. See id.; Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600-01.
388. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 712-14. This is because heightened 
scrutiny would be warranted and would make laws that infringed upon sexual 
orientation, like infertility laws requiring heterosexual intercourse, have to satisfy 
the most stringent level of scrutiny. See id.
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protections and stringent scrutiny requirements.389 Conversely, an 
argument can be made that same-sex couples cannot be excluded 
from infertility insurance coverage based on sexual orientation as a 
general classification warranting no extra protection, as unpopular 
groups cannot be targeted and discriminated against per Romer. 390
a. Utilizing Lawrence: Sexual Orientation as a Suspect 
Classification 
If sexual orientation was a suspect classification, or if the 
reasoning from Lawrence was utilized to argue that it is at least 
protected under the law, then statutes that explicitly and implicitly 
discriminate against same-sex couples via heteronormative infertility 
definitions391 could be unconstitutional on their face.392 If a facial 
classification exists, heightened scrutiny automatically applies, and 
the government has the burden to prove the law is necessary or 
substantially important.393 Arguably, the government cannot 
withstand a heightened level of scrutiny because a genuine reason to 
disallow familial formation or the expansion of mankind is 
inconceivable.394 Even so, the potential exists that discriminatory 
infertility laws would also fail a rational basis analysis.395
b. Sexual Orientation as a General Classification
Sexual orientation is not currently a suspect classification; 
therefore, the argument pursuant to Romer is the sounder argument 
as the law stands today.396 For non-suspect classifications, the default 
389. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); see also Hill, supra
note 145, at 95.
390. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
391. See, e.g., CONN GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. §
431: 10A-116.5 (2013); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §5/356m(a), (c) (West 2016); M ASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47H (West 2013); N.J. STAT. § 17:48-6x (West 2017); TEX.
INS. CODE §§ 1366.003(a), 1366.005(2)-(3)(A)-(D) (West 2005).
392. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 712-13.
393. See id. at 713. Depending on the classification, this would trigger 
intermediate or strict scrutiny. See id.
394. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35 (“[L]aws of the kind now before us raise 
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward 
the class of persons affected.”).
395. See id. at 635.
396. See id. Romer used rational basis to declare a Colorado law 
discriminating against persons based on their sexual orientation unconstitutional. See 
id. However, Justice Ginsberg’s oral arguments in Obergefell v. Hodges hinted that 
654 Michigan State Law Review 2017
level of scrutiny is rational basis.397 While extreme deference is given 
to the government pursuant to rational basis and the burden is on the 
challenger to prove that the law is not rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest, laws cannot simply target an 
unpopular group and discriminate against them.398 However, upon 
review of infertility insurance statutes that exempt same-sex couples 
from satisfying the threshold requirements of being medically 
infertile and participating in heterosexual intercourse for a period of 
years,399 the laws are inherently discriminatory against same-sex 
couples. Notwithstanding the government’s interest in escaping the 
associated expenditures that would be required by offering infertility 
insurance for all married couples, there has to be an additional reason 
that is not economically grounded in order to deny the coverage.400
However, there does not appear to be a legitimate interest, aside from 
financial resources, that could justify denying coverage; thus, there is 
strong potential for a successful claim under Equal Protection.401
However, there is also a claim under Due Process, as infringements 
on the fundamental rights to procreate and marry necessitate due 
process.402
this could also be a gender classification issue, which would require laws to pass 
intermediate scrutiny. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 85, Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556). However, this is beyond the scope of this 
Note.
397. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 714.
398. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 
714.
399. See generally NCSL, supra note 220 (summarizing the state infertility 
statutes).
400. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (“Financial cost 
alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a 
particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision. But the 
Government’s interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and
administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed.”).
401. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
402. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 934; see also Blake, supra note 11,
at 683 (“As notions of reproductive freedom continue to develop and as technologies 
like ART continue to become more mainstream, courts may more readily be willing 
to acknowledged a positive right of reproduction and even ART.”). But see 
NeJaime, supra note 292, at 2270 (stating that equal protection and due process 
claims for same-sex parental equality may take years to materialize).
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2. Due Process Provides for Coverage Where it is Due
Pursuant to substantive due process, the government must show 
adequate reason for infringing upon a fundamental right.403
Procreation has been a recognized fundamental right since the early 
1940s, and laws that infringe upon that right are only constitutional if 
they satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis.404 Additionally, marriage has 
been declared a fundamental right since 1976 and was extended to 
same-sex couples in 2015.405 Therefore, pursuant to the Due Process 
Clause, infertility statutes that impede insurance access for same-sex 
couples infringe upon their fundamental rights to procreate and 
marry.406
Since fundamental rights are infringed, strict scrutiny is 
triggered.407 The next question within a due process analysis requires 
a showing that the fundamental right is infringed.408 However, the 
law also requires that the infringement be substantial and direct.409
When same-sex couples cannot achieve biological parenthood 
because their access to insurance is restricted, thus preventing relief 
from the financial burden of ART, their right to procreate is 
substantially and directly infringed.410 Similarly, when children are 
such a fundamental aspect of marriage as denoted by Justice
Kennedy, laws that hinder that associated privilege substantially and 
directly infringe upon the fundamental right to marry.411 The third 
question in a due process analysis requires the government to prove 
that laws granting infertility insurance to heterosexual couples and 
not to same-sex couples are essential,412 but it is difficult to conceive 
403. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 935 (explaining procreation as a 
fundamental right that triggers strict scrutiny when a challenged law infringes on 
that right).
404. See id. at 933.
405. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (extending the 
fundamental right to same-sex couples); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1976) 
(declaring marriage a fundamental right). 
406. Contra Blake, supra note 11 (discussing Due Process and ART before 
the Obergefell decision).
407. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 936.
408. See id. at 938.
409. See id.
410. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 156-58.
411. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600-01 (2015) 
(illuminating the symbiotic relationship between marriage and children).
412. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 938.
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any potential reasons that are not ludicrous.413 Lastly, the government 
must show that the insurance statute is sufficiently related to the 
statutory purpose—which is habitually to provide alternative access 
to parenthood to those who cannot achieve it.414 Statutory purpose 
cannot only accommodate heterosexual couples’ desire for biological 
parenthood because same-sex couples have the identical desire to 
achieve biological parenthood.415 Therefore, same-sex couples’ 
fundamental rights to marriage and procreation are severely 
infringed by laws that disallow ART coverage and establish barriers 
for their achievement of familial life.416
Not surprisingly, given the symbiotic relationship of children 
and families, same-sex couples are employing alternatives to natural 
procreation—ART treatments—at an increasing rate as a means to 
fulfill their desire to have a family.417 However, unjustness ensues 
when same-sex couples—and not heterosexual couples—are 
required to expend considerable capital in order to fulfill their desire 
for biological parenthood, their fundamental right to procreate, and 
their associated marital privilege to childbearing—which is both 
intolerable and unconstitutional.418 At its core, equal protection 
forbids similarly situated persons—namely, married couples, both 
heterosexual and homosexual alike—from being discriminated 
against.419 Thus, the heteronormative nature of state insurance 
mandates that exclude same-sex couples from receiving insurance 
coverage for the immutable infertility they face runs afoul of the 
413. Cf. Blake, supra note 11, at 683-86. At the time of the writing, the 
fundamental right to marry was not extended to same-sex couples. Thus, the 
author’s argument that there is no Due Process violation for laws because 
“[r]egardless of whether these mandates result in unequal distribution of or costs for 
ART across differing marital statuses and sexual orientation,” can be refuted using 
the holding and reasoning in Obergefell. See id. at 681.
414. See supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.
415. See Orentlicher, supra note 168, at 653; see also DAAR, supra note 177,
at 474 (stating that same-sex couples want to achieve biological parenthood just as 
much as heterosexual couples and that ART is a way for them to achieve that goal).
416. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
417. See id. (discussing how homosexual persons and same-sex couples have 
employed ART to start their desired families).
418. See Jacoby, supra note 10, at 150 (explaining that individuals will go 
into substantial debt to attempt to obtain biological parenthood, including taking out 
a second mortgage, selling assets, and siphoning savings and retirement accounts).
419. See Blake, supra note 11, at 686-92 (discussing Equal Protection as 
applied to ART and how the government must confer benefits equally where it 
confers them).
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 
and of Obergefell. 420
CONCLUSION
Equalizing same-sex couples’ right to marry in Obergefell was
a giant step toward awarding same-sex couples the fundamental 
rights they deserve.421 However, it was only one of the necessary 
steps in the process.422 For many marital couples, one of the most 
important aspects of marriage is procreation, and the subsequent
opportunity to raise their biological children within their own family 
unit—so important that Justice Kennedy pronounced it as a 
fundamental aspect and associated privilege of marriage in 
Obergefell. 423 Simply put, same-sex couples should not have to 
struggle to achieve biological parenthood purely because they are 
anatomically incapable of naturally conceiving a child.424 By 
virtually requiring same-sex couples to bankrupt themselves in order 
to obtain the family that they want and deserve is, by definition,
unjust and unconstitutional.425 Ceasing the declaration of infertility 
solely as a medical issue and providing infertility insurance coverage 
for same-sex couples diminishes the disparate treatment that plagues 
the homosexual community—which Obergefell set out to do in 
2015.426 While labeling same-sex couples infertile because of their 
homosexual immutability may be more unconventional than what 
many people are used to, that is of insignificant magnitude—as 
same-sex couples “ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law [and] 
[t]he Constitution grants them that right.” 427
420. See generally id. (discussing the implications of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with denying ART to homosexual persons, but concluding differently 
because at the time of the writing same-sex marriage was not utilized).
421. See supra Section I.B (discussing the Obergefell decision in depth).
422. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 22-23 (discussing the changes that 
need to be made post-Obergefell).
423. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015) (declaring 
childbearing a fundamental aspect of marriage).
424. See DAAR, supra note 177, at 474 (explaining same-sex couples’ equal 
desire to obtain biological parenthood).
425. See generally Jacoby, supra note 10 (discussing the financial burdens 
imposed by financing ART out-of-pocket).
426. See Aloni & Daar, supra note 11, at 22 (explaining that Obergefell is a 
giant step towards an egalitarian family law regime).
427. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
